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Game Theoretical Analysis of Material 
Accountancy 
Abstract 
Game theoretical models and analysis are provided for the sequential material 
accountancy problem. We model the n-period problern as a general sequential game 
played between the Operator and the Inspector. The game is analyzed through 
the solution concept of (Nash) equilibrium. We study several versions of the game 
corresponding to various assumption on the payoffs and the strategy sets. The first 
model solved is what we refer to as the static game. This is a game in which detection 
time is unimportant and the operator has to decide about his diversion plan at the 
beginning of the game (and he cannot deviate from it in a later stage). The solution of 
this game is obtained by its decomposition into two simpler games: a zero-sum game 
which determines the diversionplan and the statistical test (which turned out tobe 
the CUMUF test) and a second, non zero-sum game which determines the diversion 
probability and the false alarm probability. 
Next we return to the sequential game and prove that under the assumptions 
underlying the statistical analysis, the CUMUF test emerges as part of the solution of 
the game i.e., as the inspector's strategy in equilibrium. Then we consider a 'really 
sequential' game in which early detection is important and in which the operator 
can retreat (in view of high observed intermediate MJF ) from completing a diversion 
plan that he has started. We find the structure of the equilibrium and the equilibrium 
equations of this game . These equations turn out to be too complex to be solved 
analytically, hence we provide numerical solutions which give interesting insight into 
the problem. 
Spieltheoretische Untersuchungen zur Materialbilanzierung 
Zusammenfassung 
Spieltheoretische Modelle und Untersuchungen für das sequentielle 
Materialbilanzierungsproblem werden vorgestellt. Das n-Perioden 
Problem wird als allgemeines sequentielles Spiel modelliert, das 
zwischen einem "Betreiber" und einem "Inspektor" gespielt wird. 
Anhand des Lösungskonzepts des Nash-Equilibriums wird das Spiel 
analysiert. Verschiedene Versionen des Spiels werden untersucht, 
die mit verschiedenen Annahmen über die Auszahlungsfunktionen und 
den Strategiemengen der Spieler korrespondieren. zuerst wird das 
sogenannte "statische Spiel" betrachtet. In diesem Spiel ist die 
"Entdeckungszeit" ohne Einfluß und der Setreiber muß seine 
Entwendungsstrategie zu Beginn des Spieles unwiderruflich 
festlegen. Die Lösung des Spiels erhält man durch seine Aufteilung 
in zwei einfachere Spiele: eines Null-Summen-Spiels, das die 
Entwendungsstrategie und den statistischen Test (der sich als der 
CUMUF-Test herausstellt) bestimmt und eines weiteren, Nicht-Null-
Summen-Spiels, das die Entwendungswahrscheinlichkeit und die 
Fehlalarmrate ermittelt. 
Dann wird das sequentielle Spiel untersucht und bewiesen, daß sich 
der CUMUF-Test unter gewissen Annahmen als Teil der Lösung des 
Spiels herausstellt, d.h. er ist die Strategie des Inspektors im 
Equilibrium. Als nächstes wird das "echt sequentielle" Spiel 
untersucht, in dem eine frühzeitige Aufdeckung einer Abzweigung 
von Bedeutung ist und in dem der Setreiber seinen (a priori) 
Entwendungsplan nicht vollenden muß, falls zu große Bilanz-
ergebnisse auftreten. Die Struktur des Equilibriums sowie die 
Equilibriumsgleichungen werden angegeben. Da diese Gleichungen zu 
komplex sind für eine analytische Behandlung, werden numerische 
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Material accountancy is a methodology designed to control materials with particular 
properties- rare, unpleasant, dangerous, precious- that are used by man in the course 
of his economic and social activities but their use requires the exercise of special care. 
In particular, material accountancy is practiced to a loss or diversion of materials for 
purposes unknown, but illegal according to some agreement, law or treaty. 
Examples for this use of material accountancy arediverse environmental problems; 
here it is to be guaranteed that certain pollutants are released to the environment 
only within permitted standards. Other examples are arms control and disarmament 
agreements where the appropriate use of troops, equipment or special materials has 
tobe controlled. In fact, it was the Treaty for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
and its veri:fication provisions, performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in Vienna through its Nuclear Material Safeguarcis Systems, which stimulated 
the most detailed work in this area. 
How can this use of the material accountancy principle be formulated in a simple 
and applicable way? A straightforward formulation might state that any material 
entering a well de:fined area - called material balance area - cannot simply disappear 
i.e., either it is still there, or it has left it. A quantitative description of this principle 
for one material balance area aud one inventory period [t0 , tt] goes as follows. 
At time t0 there is an amount / 0 of the material (in the material balance area) 
which we call the beginning real inventory. The algebraic sum of the amounts of 
material that enter and leave the material balance are in the time interval [t0 , t 1], is 
called the net fiow and denoted by D. The real inventory at time t 0 plus the net flow 
in [to, t 1] is the book inventory B = ! 0 + D at time t 1 i.e., the amount of material that 
should be in the material balance area at time t 1 • The amount of material actually 
contained in the material balauce area at time it is called the ending real inventory 
and denoted by / 1 • If all material contained in and passing through the material 
balance area in the time interval [t0 , t 1] is carefully accounted for, if no material has 
disappeared or has been diverted, and if there are no measurement errors, then the 
difference between the book inventory B and the real inventory / 1 should be zero. 
This is simply a consequence of the law of the conservation of matter. However, 
since not all of these conditions are always satis:fied, the difference between these two 
quantities at the end of the inventory period, which for historical reasons has beeu 
called Material Unaccounted For (MJF ), 
MJF = B - /1 = Io + D - !t, 
is not always zero. Thus arises the problern of :finding out the various causes for this 
difference being nonzero and, of trying to separate them. 
Statistically, this problern is treated as follows: We assume that J\!IJF is a normally 
distributed random variable (r.v.) with variance u 2 given by 
u2 = var(MJF') = var(/0 ) + var(D) + var(It)· 
There are two hypothesis Ho and H1 regarding the expected value E(MJF ), namely 
1 
E(MJF) = 0 
E(MJF) = Jt > 0 
(legal behavior) 
(illegal behavior ). 
The standard hypothesis testing procedure to decide which of the two hypothesis is 
true, is based on the observed value of MJF - denoted by MJP - and is of the form: 
Reject H0 (and accept H1 ) if and only if MJP > s. 
The threshold s is determined by the false alarm (type I error) probability a, 
through the relation 
1 - a = Po { MJF :S s} = <P ( ~) , 
where P0 denotes the probability given that H0 is true, and <fo( ·) is the cumulative 
standard normal distribution. The e:fficiency of this test is measured, as usual, by its 
power ( one minus type II error probability, ß). This is the detection probability given 
by 
1-ß ( s- "') Pt{MJF > s} ~ 1- <P -u-
<P (;- U(1 - a)) , 
where P1 denotes the probability given that H1 is true, and U(·) is the inverse of <fo(-). 
Note that 1- ß(a) is a concave function of a satisfying 1- ß(O) = 0 and 1-ß(l) = 1. 
In general, a sequence of n inventory periods [t0 , t 1], ••• , [tn-t, tn] is considered 
for each of which, a single material balance statistics is observed namely 
MJF i = li-1 + Di - h i = 1, ... , n. 
The test for deciding whether or not an illegal action has taken place, involves several 
new problems: On the technicallevel, the statistical analysis is more complicated since 
MJF i, i = 1, ... , n are correlated, due to the intermediate inventory which appears 
in two adjacent MJF i· On a more fundamental Ievel, it is not clear what is now 
an appropriate measure of e:fficiency, in particular if one has some kind of sequential 
decision procedure in mind. It is also not clear what is now the alternative hypothesis 
H1 corresponding to illegal behavior, since there are many different possibilities for 
loss or diversion of material within the n inventory periods. This adds to the model a 
second decision maker, the operator. This is the decision maker who decides whether 
to behave legally or illegally and what form of illegal behavior to choose. 
One is thus driven from the standard statistical analysis to a game theoretical 
analysis involving two decision makers: the operator who decides whether to divert 
and how to divert material, and the inspector who controls the operator by observing 
data, establishing the material balances, and decides whether or not to declare that 
an illegal action has taken place. In a slightly different variant of the situation, the 
operator has to report a certain set of data which he may try to falsify. The inspector 
then may verify some of the data by independent measurements and declare whether 
or not an illegal action ( falsification) has taken place. 
2 
2 Game theoretical framework 
In a general multistage inspection game, there are two players: the operator, denoted 
as player 0 , and the inspector, denoted as player I . The game proceeds in n 
stages. In stage i, i = 1, ... , n, player 0 has an action set Mi consisting of all 
(pure- nonrandomized) actions available to him at that stage. The action set of the 
inspector I is the samein all stages, and consists of two elements A (alarm) and C 
( clear or continue). 
Xt, ... , Xn are the signals ( or observations) at stages 1, ... , n respectively. Typ-
ically, Xi is a random variable (r.v.) with values in a finite dimensional EucHclean 
space Ei. The distribution of these r.v. are given by transition probabilities JI, ... , fn: 
fi : Mt 0 Et0, ... , ®Mi-t 0 Ei-t 0 Mi ~ f:l(Ei), 
where by convention, Mo = E0 = 0 and for any set E, we denote by b.(E) the space of 
probability distributions on E. That is, for any history of i actions m 11 ..• , mi, (mi E 
Mi) and i -1 observations Xt, ... ,Xi-t, (xi E Ei), f(·l mt,Xt, ... ,mi-t,Xi-t,mi) is 
the probability density of the r.v. xi observed at stage i. 
For i = 1, ... , n, Ii and Oi arereal functions on the product space M10, ... , ®Mi. 
These are the payoff functions to I and 0 respectively, if the game stops by an alarm 
at stage i < n. Finally, I and 0 are two real functions on Mt®, ... , ®Mn, the payoff 
functions when the game ends after n stages with no alarm called. 2 
The game is played as follows: 
e At stage 1, the operator 0 chooses an action m 1 E M1 (not observable by 
the inspector I ). An observation x1 is drawn from a r.v. X1 with density 
ft(· I mt)· This observation becomes common knowledge to both players. 
111 The inspector chooses either C, in which case the game continues tostage 2, or 
A, in which case the game terminates (by an alarm) with payoffs (It(m1), Ot (m1)). 
• Inductively: At stage i = 2, ... , n, if the game has not been terminated before, 
player 0 chooses mi E Mi, and an observation Xi is made from the r.v. with 
density fi(· I mt, Xt, ... , mi-b Xi-1, mi)· 
Player I chooses either C, in which case the game continues to stage i + 1, if 
i < n, and terminates with payoffs (J(m1 , ••• , mn), O(mt, ... , mn)) if i = n, or 
he chooses A, in which case the game terminates (by an alarm) with payoffs 
(Ji(mt, ... , mi), Oi(mt, ... , mi)). 
Note that by this notation we assume that the payoffs are determined only by the 
actions of the operator and do not depend on the observations. This is quite reason-
able if no alarm is called, in case of alarm this irnplies the implicit assumption that 
the actual diversions are checked and found out after the alarm. 
21n order to incorporate the standard notation ofboth game theory and statistics, used extensively 
in this paper, we denote the operator's actions by m since we reserve the Ietter 1-l for the conventional 
use as the expected value of the MJF random variable. 
3 
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Figure 1: The game in extensive form. 
4 
2.1 Restrietions on players' strategies 
Our first step in analyzing the above described general model, is to consider a special 
case corresponding to the situation in which time is not important- in spite of the 
sequential nature of the problem, and of the model, the only issues of interest are 
whether or not an illegal action took place, and whether or not an alarmwas called. 
In addition to being a natural simple case to start with, this is an attempt to relate 
our model to the existing, mainly statistical, analysis which is basically static, as far 
as the decision making process is concerned. To do this, we imposerestrictions on the 
players' strategies capturing the underlying assumptions of most existing analysis. 
Assumption 2.1 • The operator's diversion strategy is completely determined at 
the beginning of the game, as he chooses either not to divert - (mi = 0, i = 
1, ... , n), or to divert according to a plan of the form m = (mt, ... , mn) with 
mi 2::: 0 and Ei mi =GM, for a fixed constant GM> 0. 
• The inspector may call an alarm only at the end of the n-th stage, after having 
observed the whole vector x = (xt, ... , xn)· 
The first part of the assumption says that even if I decides on calling an alarm already 
at time i < n he mayasweil wait till the end of the game since timeisnot important. 
In the second part of the assumption, GM is to be thought of as a "Critical Mass" 
in the sense that any diversion less than GM is worthless to 0 and harmless to I . 
Similarly, any diversion greater than GM has the same effect as a diversion of GM. 
Weshallreturn to this point later. By changing units, weshall assume without loss of 
generality that GM= 1. So by this assumption, 0 decides at the beginning whether 
to divert or not. If he chooses to divert, he selects a distribution of the critical amount 
along the n stages and he has no opportunity to change this any more. 
In view of Assumption 2.1, the game is basically a "one stage game" in which 
0 moves first to choose C (legal behavior) or l (illegal behavior) tagether with a 
diversion vector m = (m1 , ... , mn)· Then a random vector x is observed and the 
inspector decides whether or not to call an alarm. This extensive form game, which 
we derrote by r 0 , is described in Figure 2. The encircled area in the figure derrotes the 







(I(A,f), O(A,f))(I(C,f), O(C,f)) (I(A, l), O(A,l)) (I(C, l), O(C, l)) 
Figure 2: The restricted game f 0 in extensive form. 
To analyze the game r 0 we first choose convenient payoff scales. Table 1 gives the 
payoffs for I and 0 at the end points of the game i.e., for all combinations of .e or l 
with A or 0. 
Operator 
.e l 
Inspector c 10,0) (-1,11 
A ( -e, -h) ( -a, -b) 
Table 1: The payoffs for f 0 • 
The entries of Table 1 are ordered pairs ( x, y) in which x is the payoff for I and y is 
the payoff for 0 . As can be seen from the table, we chose the status-quo payoff to 
be 0 for both players (I(f, 0) = O(f, 0) = 0), and the payoffs for undetected illegal 
behavior, (l, 0), are 1 for 0 and -1 for I . Since this is the worst event for I , 
it is reasonable to assume 0 < e < 1, 0 < a < 1 and 0 < h < b. Sometimes it is 
also assumed that e < a which means that for the inspector, a detection of diversion, 
which means a "failure of safeguards", is worse than the inconvenience of a false 
alarm. 
A pure strategy of I is an alarm set A C E 1 ® ... ® En with the interpretation 
that I calls an alarm, at the end of the n-th period, if and only if (x~, ... , xn) E A. 
A mixed strategy s is a probability distribution on pure strategies. 
A pure strategy of 0 is a choice between f and l and a diversion plan m = 
(mt, ... , mn) satisfying Ei mi = 1. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution 
6 
on such pairs. Since the game under consideration is of perfect recall (see Kuhn 
(1953)), any mixed strategy is equivalent to a behavioral strategy t = (q,p) where q 
is the probability of l and p is the probability distribution on diversion plans m if l 
is chosen. 
A pair of strategies (s, t), determines two conditional probabilities: 
a(s, t) = Ps,t{A I f, s} and ß(s, t) = Ps,t{ C ll, s, t}, 
where P8 ,t is the probability distribution on outcomes induced by the strategies (s, t) 
(and the probabilities fi ; i = 1, ... , n.) That is, a(s, t) is the false alarm probability 
(type I error probability), and ß(s, t) is the non detection probability (type II error 
probability). Note that a(s, t) does not depend on t while ß(s, t) is linear in p. Hence 
we write a(s) and ß(s,p) = f ß(s, m)dp(m). 
The game f 0 can now be described as agame in normal form: f 0 = (S, T, I, 0) 
where S is the set of mixed strategies for I , T is the set of behavioral strategies for 
0 , I and 0 are the payoff functions for I and 0 respectively given by 
I(s, t) 
O(s, t) 
-q (a + (1- a)ß(s,p))- (1- q)ea(s) 
-q (b- (1 + b)ß(s,p))- (1- q)ha(s) 
2.2 Solution of the static game 
(1) 
(2) 
The basic solution concept in non zero-sum games is the Nash Equilibrium (which 
weshall simply refer to as equilibrium), defined as follows: 
Definition 2. 2 A pair of strategies ( s*, t*) is called an equilibrium point if 
I(s*, t*) ~ I(s, t*) Vs E S 
O(s*, t*) ~ I(s*, t) Vt E T 
The corresponding I(s*, t*) and O(s*, t*) are then called equilibrium payoffs of the 
game. 
First, we observe that the game has no extreme equilibria i.e., no equilibrium in 
which 0 plays l with probability 0 or 1, and no equilibrium in which I calls an alarm 
with probability 0 or 1. This is easily seen from the payoffs structure in Table 1. In 
particular, this means that 0 < q < 1 must hold in any equilibrium. Consequently, it 
follows from (1) and the definition of equilibrium that (in any equilibrium,) p must 
be a maximizer of ß(s,p) that is, the support of p must contain only diversion vectors 
m maximizing ß(s, m). For any strategy s of I we denote therefore 
as 
ß(s) := sup ß(s,p) = sup ß(s, m). (3) 
P m 
For an equilibriumpoint (s,t), the payofffunctions (1) and (2) can thus be written 
I(s, t) 
O(s, t) 
-q(a + (1- a)ß(s))- (1- q)ea(s) 




Note that we actually eliminated the diversion vector m from the strategy of 0 
since in equilibrium, it has to be determined by {3). It will however reappear in an 
auxiliary game to be discussed later. 
Proceeding to determine q and s in equilibrium, observe that player 0 's payoff 
is -ha(s) if he chooses land {1 + b)ß(s)- b if he chooses l. It follows that in the 
( a, ß) space player 0 's best reply to s is (see Figure 3): 
• Choose l if ß( s) < _!!_b - _!!_b. 
' 1 + 1 + 
- b h 
• Choose l if ß( s) > 1 + b - 1 + b. 
e Choose any of the two if ß( s) = _!!_b - _!!:_b · 
1+ I+ 
In Figure 3 we give the inspector's payoffs in the ( a, ß) square as he uses a strategy 







Figure 3: Payoff for I in ro, when I uses ( a, ß) test and 0 plays a best reply. 
Note that the inspector's payoff is discontinuous along the line L where it is also 
not defined since the operator, beingindifferent between land l, can use any mixture 
of them as a best reply tos. 
To maximize his payoff, the inspector is not free "to pick a point" in the ( a, ß) 
square but rather, he chooses a strategy s which determines the point ( a, ß). In 
other words, the domain in Figure 3 is restricted by the line ß = ß( a) of the relation 
between a and the ß attainable by the most powerful test, that is 
ß(a) = inf{ß{s) I a(s) = a}, 
8 
or, substituting ß(s) from (3), 




The function ß(a) is determined by distribution of the r.v. X = (X1 , •.• , Xn), 
and very mild assumptions on this (satisfied for instance by the multivariate normal 
distribution which we will assume in this paper) yields: 
Assumption 2.3 The line ß = ß(a) is well defined for all a E [0, 1]. It is differen-
tiable, convex, strictly decreasing and satisfies ß(O) = 1, ß(1) = 0. 
Looking back to equation (6), it suggests that ß(a) may be viewed as minimax 
value of some zero surri game. In fact define an auxiliary game G01 ; parameterized by 
a, as follows: 
Definition 2.4 For any a E (0, 1), the game G01 is the zero-sum game with the 
players I and 0 in which 
• the pure strategy space of player I {the maximizer) is the set of all strategies 
{i. e., Statistical tests} with type I error probability not exceeding a, 
E01 = {s I a(s) ~ a}, 
• the pure strategy space of player 0 {the minimizer) is the set M of all diversion 
vectors 
M = {m = (mt, ... ,mn) I mi 2::0, i = 1, ... ,n, l:mi = 1}, 
i 
• the payoff {from 0 to I ) when ( s, m) is played is the detection probability 
1- ß(s, m). 
In other words, the game G01 captures one part of our original game namely, the 
situation resulting after the operator has decided to behave illegally and the inspector 
has decided to use tests with false alarm probability of at most a. Thus, G01 does not 
depend directly on the parameters of the original game, but only through the fact 
that these parameters determine the value of a in equilibrium. 
Proposition (2.3) can now be rewritten in terms of G01 as follows: 
Proposition 2.5 For any a E (0, 1), the game G01 has a value v(a) = 1- ß(a) and 
both players have optimal strategies (i. e., sup and inf may be replaced respectively by 
max and min.) Furthermore, v( a) is differentiable, concave, strictly increasing with 
v(O) = 0 and v(1) = 1. 
For multivariate normally distributed X, the game G01 was solved by Avenhaus 
(1986) using the Neyman Pearson Lemma (see e.g. Rohatgi (1976)). To state this 
result, let X = (Xt, ... , Xn) be multivariate normally distributed with mean m = 
(m1, ... , mn) and covariance matrix E, and denote by 1 the column n-dimensional 
vector with all coordinates equal 1; 1' = (1, ... , 1). Avenhaus' result can now be 
stated as: 
9 
Theorem 2.6 lf X"' N(m, E), then the value of the game Ga is 
v = 1 - ß = </J (~- U(1 - a)) , 
1'E1 
where <P is the cumulative standard normal distribution, and U is its inverse. The 
optimal strategy sa of the inspector is given by the alarm set Aa: 
Aa = {x I x' · 1 > #NU(1 - a)}, 
and the optimal strategy of the operator is the (pure) diversion vector 
1 
m = 1'E1 El. 
The interesting points to be noticed here are: 
• The operator has a pure optimal strategy and thus he need not use a mixed 
strategy (i.e., randomizing over diversion plans.) 
111 The operator's optimal test is based on the statistics x'1 that is, it depends only 
on the sum of observations Xi· This is the theoretical basis for the commonly 
used CUMUF test which will reappear in our analysis later on. 
• The statistics x' · 1 is, as may be easily verified, the material balance statistic 
for the whole reference period which means that intermediate real inventories 
are ignored. 
Returning now to our game, we add the line ß = ß(a) to Figure 3 to obtain Figure 
4 in which we maximize the inspector's payoff. 
1 





Figure 4: The equilibrium values ( a*, ß*) 
As we see in Figure 4, in the region (above the line ß = ß(a)) in which 0 uses 
f, the payoff ( -ea) decreases in a, while in the region in which 0 uses l, the payoff 
10 
( -a- (1 - a)ß) decreases in ß. It follows that the maximum is attained at the 
intersection of the line ß = ß(a) and the straight line L, we thus have: 
Corollary 2. 7 Jf ( s*, t*) is an equilibrium of the game r 0 , then the corresponding 
( a*, ß*) is the unique solution of 
ß( *) b h * a =b+1-b+1a. (7) 
Since ( a*, ß*) is on the line L, by the definition of this line, s* makes the operator 
indifferent between C and l and so, adopting an illegal behavior with any probability 
q is a best reply to s*. However, the payoff of the operator does depend on q since i t 
is given by 
I(s*, q) = -q[a + (1- a)ß(a*)]- (1- q)ea*. (8) 
The value q* of q at equilibrium is determined by the condition that a* is a best reply 
to q* that is, it is the value of a maximizing 
I(s, q*) = -q*[a + (1- a)ß(a)]- (1- q"')ea. (9) 
Due to the properties of ß(a) and due to 0 < e < a < 1, this function has a one local 
maximum at the point a* satisfying the first order condition: 
~ = e- (1- a)ß'(a*), 
q* 
(10) 
where ß'(a*) is the derivative with respect to a of ß(a), evaluated at a*. Note that 
0 < q* < 1 as expected from our assumptions. Also, it can be easily verified that a* 
satisfying (10) is also the global maximum of (9) i.e., the unique best reply to q*. It 
follows that the equilibrium values ( a*, q*) are the solution to equations (7) and (10). 
Given these values, the rest of the equilibrium strategies (i.e., s* and the diversion 
plan m*) are determined as optimal strategies in the auxiliary game G01•. 
Our discussion of the equilibrium point can now be summarized by the following: 
Theorem 2.8 The game ro given in Figure 2 has a unique equilibrium (s*, (q*, m*)) 
in which 
e the false alarm probability a* = a( s*) is the solution of (7), 
e the probability q* of illegal behavior is given by the solution of (10), and 
• the strategy s* and the diversion plan m* are optimal strategies in the game 
GOI •. 
Note that the uniqueness claimed in Theorem 2.8 is only for ( a*, ß*, q*). There 
may well be more than one s* or m* although those may also be unique in special 
cases (such as the above mentioned multivariate normal distribution case.) 
A special case worth noticing is when ß(a) = 1 - a. In this case equations (7) 
and (10) yield 
1 * e and q = , 
1+e-a 1+b-h 
11 
which is the ( unique) mixed equilibrium of the matrix game in Table 1. This corre-
sponds to a situation in which the inspector has no specific test procedure for detecting 
illegal behavior of the operator; he just decides to call an alarm or not without basing 
his decision on any information. ( a"', 1 - a"') is then just a mixed strategy, a"' being 
the probability of calling an alarm. 
3 A sequential model 
The above assumptions that led to the solution of the game using the Neyman Pearson 
Lemma in the auxiliary game, are admittedly quite restrictive in that they actually 
suppress the dynamic nature of the problem: time is explicitly assumed to be unim-
portant, and each player makes one time decision. Our aim in the rest of this paper 
is to relax these assumptions and solve a game theoretical model in which time is 
important, and the decision process is really sequential. Given the difficulty of the 
problem, our analysis will be for a two period model, although some of the results 
and ideas are valid for a Ionger horizon model which we plan to develop in the next 
stage of this research. More specifically, the features captured in our model are: 
• The significant amount of diverted material is 1 (by appropriate choice of units.) 
• The operator has no utility for less than 1 unit of mass diverted, and has no 
increment of utility for any additional mass beyond 1. This implies that ( under 
any reasonable inspection policy) any second period diversion which is neither 
0 nor completion to 1 is dominated. 
e The operator has the option to retreat in second the period from his diversion 
plan (i.e., not completing the diversion he started with) if it is "too risky". 
• Alarm as such has a negative utility for both players. However, the more ma-
terial "caught" to be diverted the worse it is for the operator and (relatively) 
better it is for the inspector. 
e Time is valuable: Any amount of material diverted at first period, carries an 
additional penalty for the inspector to the second period. 
• The negative effect for the inspector of an undetected diversion, increases with 
the amount diverted ( and may have discontinuous jump at the critical mass 1.) 
The two person non zero-sum game with players 0 ( operator) and I (inspector) 
is played in two periods as follows: 
Period 1 
• 0 chooses m E [0, 1] (mass diverted in first period.) 
• A random variable X1 "' N( m, ai) is observed by both players ( denote this 
observation by x11 this is MJF 1). 
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eil I chooses one of the two actions: C1 ( continue to second period) or A1 ( declare 
an alarm) which stops the game and assigns payoffs (-a(m), -b(m)) to I and 
0 respecti vely. 
Period 2 
• 0 chooses one of the two actions: D (complete diversion to 1) or R (retreat.) 
eil A random variable X 2 is observed by both players ( denote this observation by 
x2, this is MJF 2· )' The conditional distribution of x2 given m and Xt is 
"' N(1- m + p cr2 (x1 - m) , (1- p2 )cr~) 
Ut 
"' N(p cr2 (xt- m), (1- p2 )u~) 
Ut 
{crt, u2 and p are given parameters of the joint distribution of (Xt, X2).) 
• I chooses one of the two actions: C2 (no alarm) or A2 (declare an alarm.) In 
both cases the game ends and payoffs are made as indicated in Figure 5. 






Figure 5: The extensive form game. 
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Payoff functions 
In the payoffs indicated in Figure 5 8( m) is a step function which is 1 if m = 1 and 
0 if m < 1. All functions and constants are non negative. We rnake the following 
assurnptions: 
• Undetected diversion of critical arnount 1, which is the worst event for I and 
the best for 0 , corresponds to payoffs ( -1, 1) (by appropriate choi ce of u tili ty 
units.) 
• The disutility of I frorn undetected diversion of arnount m is F(m) which we 
assurne increasing in m, F(O) = 0 and F(1) = 1. 
• Any alarrn results in a disutilities -a(m) and -b(m), for I and 0 respectively, 
where m is the arnount which is actually diverted. We assurne that a( m) de-
creases in m, and b(m) increases in m, with a(1) = a < 1 and b(1) = b > 0 
corresponding to the disutilities for detection of a full diversion. The rnotivation 
for this assurnption is that, since as long as m < 1 the inspector has no direct 
disutility frorn a diversion of arnount m, his disutility -a( m) frorn an alarrn is 
the darnage for his reputation and reliability: As m is higher, the alarrn is 'rnore 
justi:fied' and hence there is less darnage for the inspector's reputation. As for 
the operator; a larger m is rnore evident for 'intended illegal action' which rnay 
provoke a rnore severe punishrnent and rnore darnage for his reputation. 
• The function d( m) is the (additional) disutility to the inspector frorn early 
diversion. We assume that it is an increasing function of m and d(O) = 0. 
We do not assurne continuity of the payoff functions, which may typically be 
discontinuous at the critical rnass m = 1. 
Strategies 
Noting that the garneunder consideration is a garne of perfect recall, there is no loss 
of generality, and in fact it is rnore natural in our context, to consider only behavioral 
strategies (Aurnann (1964)), which are: 
• A strategy ofthe inspector isanordered pair s = ( a1, a2), where a1 is a transition 
probability frorn n to {At, Ct} and a2 is a transition probability frorn 'R.-2 to 
{A2,C2}. 
Interpretation: if Xt = x1 then I chooses A1 (i.e., calls an alarrn) with proba-
bility at(xt). If the garne reaches the second period with X 1 = x1 and X2 = x2, 
then I calls an alarrn according to the curnulative probability distribution 
a2(Xt,x2)· Given a strategy s = (at,a2), for any Xt E n let 
A2(xt) = {x2 E n I a2(Xt,X2) = A2} and C2(xt) = {x2 E n I a2(Xt,X2) = C2}· 
So given Xt and given that no alarrn was called at :first period, then A2 ( x1) is 
the set of MJF2 observations that will surely provoke an alarrn while C 2 (x1) is 
the set of MJF 2 observations that will surely not provoke an alarrn. 
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111 A strategy of the operator is an ordered pair t = (q,p) where q is a measure 
on [0, 1], the probability distribution of the first period diversion m, and p is a 
transition probability from [0, 1] X n to {D, R} that is, p(m, xt) = P(D Im, Xt) 
is the probability of completing the diversion at second period given that m was 
already diverted at first period, the observed X1 (i.e., MJF 1 ) was x 1 and the I 
did not call an alarm at first period. 
E and T denote the strategy sets of I and 0 respectively. Observe that both 
sets are convex. Any pair of strategies (s, t) determines a probability distribution on 
outcomes and hence expected payoff functions for the players which we denote by 
I(s, t) (for the inspector) and O(s, t) (for the operator.) 
4 The structure of equilibrium 
Our main objective is to study the equilibrium, as given by Definition 2.2, of the 
above described game. The major problern here is the size and complexity of the 
strategy sets which makes it practically impossible even to write the equilibrium 
conditions in a workable form. We prove first that for finding equilibrium points, 
only much smaller sets of strategies may be considered. Only threshold strategies can 
be equilibrium strategies. More precisely we have the following theorems the proofs 
of which are given in the Appendix. 
Theorem 4.1 (Second period test for the inspector.) If s is an equilibrium strategy 
of I then: 
(i) To any x1 not followed by an alarm at first period, there is a critical value 
c2 ( Xt) E ( -oo, oo) such that: 
x 2 > c2(x1) ===} a2(x11 x 2 ) = 1 (i.e., call alarm surely.) 
x 2 < c2 (xt) ===} a2 (x~, x 2 ) = 0 (i.e., surely, alarm is not called.) 
(ii) The function c2(xt) is decreasing in x 1 
Theorem 4.2 (Second period test for the operator.) If t is an equilibrium strategy 
of 0 then: 
(i) for (almost) each x 1 there is m*(x1) suchthat 
m > m*(xt) ===} p(m, Xt) = 1 
m < m*(xt) ===} p(m, Xt) = 0 
(1.1') The funct;on m*(xt) • is increasing in x 1 • Thus, the inverse function x*(m) zs 
increasing in m. 
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The function x* is a threshold function: If 0 diverted m at the first period, then 
he completes his diversion if x1 :::; x*(m) and retreats if x1 > x*(m). 
The last theorem in this section establishes the first period threshold in the equilib-
riurn inspection strategy. 
Theorem 4.3 (First period test for the inspector.) If s is an equilibrium strategy of 
I then the alarm set at the first period is determined by a critical value ClJ that is: 
Xt > Ct ==> at(xt) = 1 (i.e., call alarrn surely.) 
Xt < Ct ==> at(x1) = 0 (i.e., surely, alarm is not called.) 
When x1 = c1 , the inspector is indifferent between calling an alarrn or not. However, 
in our rnodel this event has zero probability. 
5 The CUMUF test as an equilibrium strategy 
To 'calibrate' our garne theoretical rnodel we shall first relate it to the existing sta-
tistical treatment of the problem. One of the commonly used statistical test is the 
WMUF test according to which no alarm is called before the end of the last period, 
and the statistics for the test is the sum of the MJF 's in all periods. Can this test 
emerge from our game model? In this section we prove that in fact, the WMUF test 
is part of the solution of our game model if we make some appropriate assumptions. 
5.1 Assumptions underlying the statistical treatment 
Evidently, to obtain the WMUF as a game theoretical solution, we have to impose 
some restrictions on the game (i.e., on the payoffs and on the strategies) which reflect 
the underlying assumptions of this statistical test. Theseare basically that the payoffs 
are proportional to the false alarm probability and the probability of undetected 
diversion. This is captured by the following assumption (which incorporates our 















m ~ 1 
(11) 
In words this assumption means that the darnage of an alarm, which need not be 
the same for both agents, is independent of the amount of material actually diverted 
( (i) and (ii)). Undetected diversion is relevant if and only if it exceeds the critical value 
1 ((iv), recall that incorporated in our model is also the similar assumption regarding 
the operator.) And finally, part (iii) states that detection time is unimportant. 
Additional restriction is needed on the 0 's strategy set due to the fact that the 
statistical framework is basically static: The operator has to decide at the beginning 
of the game whether or not to divert. 1f he diverts a positive amount m at the first 
period, he also (surely) diverts 1 - m at the second period. 
Assumption 5.2 The operator is restricted to strategies t = (q, m*) in which m*(x1 ) 
is constant in Xt. 
With these assumptions, a strategy of the operator is a pair t = ( q, m) in which q 
is the probability of diversion and m is the amount tobe diverted at the first period. 








(1- q)I(s,O) + ql(s,m) 
(1 - q)O(s, 0) + qO(s, m) 
where <P is the cumulative normal distribution function, 
1 jx u2 
<jJ(x) = - exp(--)dt. y'2; -oo 2 
Remarks 
• I(s, 0) and O(s, 0) increase both in c1 and c2 reflecting the fact that if no 
diversion is committed it is better for both agents to avoid a false alarm. 
• I(s, m) is a decreasing function both of c1 and c2 and goes to -a as c1 -t -oo 
reflecting the fact that if a diversion of 1 was committed, the best thing that 




Recalling that, according to Definition 2.2, an equilibrium point is a pair of strategies 
( s*, t*) satisfying 
I(s*, t*) > I(s, t*) Vs ES 
O(s*, t*) > O(s*, t) Vt E T, 
we have first the following observations, 
• There exists no equilibrium with q = 0 (i.e., 0 surely does not divert). This is 
because the best reply of I to that is c1 = c2 = oo namely, never call an alarm. 
But this cannot be an equilibrium strategy for the operator since then 0 can 
profit by diverting safely. 
• c1 = -oo ( or c2 = -oo ), together with q = 1 consists of an equilibrium in 
which 0 surely diverts and I always calls an alarm independently of the 
MJF observations. This is of course a non interesting equilibrium of an open 
conflict between I and 0 . 
• The 'open conflict' equilibrium is the only equilibrium in which q = 1. This is 
obvious since the only best reply to a sure diversion is a sure alarm. We conclude 
that except for this trivial equilibrium in any equilibrium we have 0 < q < 1. 
Next we have 
Proposition 5.3 In equilibrium, for almost all x1 (with respect to the normal den-
sity), c2 (xt) < oo. 
Proof If Ho is the null hypothesis that no diversion took place and H1 is the 
alternative hypothesis that there was a diversion, then the likelihood ratio of (x~, x2 ) 
for these two hypothesis is 
where u2 = (1 - p2 )ui. For any x1 , this likelihood ratio tends to zero as x2 --t oo 
(recall that q > 0). It follows that for some finite c2(x1), 
and therefore I calls alarm whenever x 2 > c2(x1). 
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Assurne that (s*,t*) = (c~,c2 (·);q,m) is an equilibrium with 0 < q < 1. Since 
0 is choosing both diversion and non diversion with positive probability, it must be 
that both alternatives yields for him the same expected payoff ( otherwise t* could 
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be improved by choosing the better alternative with probability one) i.e., O(s"', 0) = 
0( s*, m) which is, 
(12) 
The expected payoff of 0 must attain its maximum at the equilibrium value m 
that is 
m = argmaxO(s*,m), 
which is (omitting the constants), 
{1Ct (c2(xt)- (1-m)- P?-(xl- m)) ( m = arg max c/> V 2 1 exp -oo 0"2 1- p (xt- -;)2) dtt}. 2cr1 
(13) 
Equations (12) and (13) express the condition that t* is a best reply tos*. The fact 
that s* is a best reply to t* is expressed by the following two condition: 
Following x 1 and c2 (xt), the inspector must be indifferent whether or not to call 
analarm in the second stage. This follows from the continuity of the payoff function 
I(s, t) in x2, since I prefers alarm when x 2 > c2(x1) and not alarm when X2 < c2(x1). 




Finally, the first stage threshold c1 must be the maximizer of the inspector's payoff 
function, that is ( omitting constants ): 
Ct = 
(15) 
The four equations (12) - (15) are the equilibrium conditions. It turns out that 
they uniquely determine the equilibrium strategies ( s*, t*). 
Theorem 5.4 (i) The game has an equilibrium ( s*, t*) in which the strategies s* = 
(ct,c2(·)) and t* = (q,m) are determined asfollows: 
8 Ct = 00, 
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• c2 = C - x11 where C is the unique solution of the equation: 
b 
= 1 +b' (16) 
(ii) Und er Assumption 8.1 (to be stated later), this equilibrium is unique. 
Proof Appendix 8.4 
In the equilibrium described in Theorem 5.4, no test is made at the first period 
and the statistics for the second period test is x1 + x 2 = MJF 1 + MJF 2 , and an alarm 
is called if MJF 1 + MJF 2 > C. This is precisely the CUMUF test. 
It is interesting to see the relationship between Theorem 5.4 and Theorem 2.8 (for 
the special case of two stages ). Both Theorems provide the solution ( equilibrium) 
to the same problern but with two different representations. In Theorem 2.8 the 
strategy of the inspector is solved by determined the false alarm probability o: which 
is then used to solve the auxiliary game G01 to obtain the threshold C of the Neyman 
Pearson test. In Theorem 5.4 there is no auxiliary game and Cis determined directly 
(not through o:) by equation (16) which is closely related to the likelihood ratio and 
the Neyman-Pearson test. The false alarm probability o:, as weil as the diversion 
probability q and the non detection probability ß are then computed explicitly from 
c. 
Note also that the value of the diversion vector, (m, 1-m), is the samein both 
theorems and it is (1/2, 1/2) if u1 = u2, independently of p. 
Part (ii) of Theorem 5.4 asserts that except for extreme configurations of distri-
bution structure which do not satisfy Assumptions 8.1, this CUMUF equilibrium is 
the only equilibrium of the game. In particular this is the case if u1 = u2 • When 
Assumptions 8.1 is not satisfied (but still satisfy p < 0), an additional equilibrium 
exists which is given in the following two Theorems, the proofs of which are given in 
Appendix 8.4 as weil. 
Theorem 5.5 lf p < -ut/u2 then there is (only) one more equilibrium (s"',t*) zn 
which the strategies s"' = (c~, c2 (·)) and t"' = (q, m) are determined as follows: 
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• c2 = C + p~x11 where C is the unique solution of the equation: (Tl 
b 
= 1 + b' 
• m=O. 
• q is the same function of C and m as in Theorem 5.4. 
(17) 
Theorem 5.6 If p < -0'2/ 0'1 then there is ( only) one more equilibrium ( s*, t*) m 
which the strategies s* = (ct,c2 (·)) and t* = (q,m) are determined as follows: 
• c2 = C + ~x1 , where C is the unique solution of the equation: PUl 
(18) 
•m=l. 
• q is the same function of C and m as in Theorem 5.4. 
To get the intuition of the last two theorems, fix p < 0 and consider the ratio 
O't/0'2. If O't is much smaller than 0'2 (so as to have p < -O'I/0'2) then 0 puts all 
diversion in second stage since MJF 1 is measured much more precisely than MJF 2 . 
In the reverse situation, when p < -0'2/0'1 ), then m = 1 i.e., all the diversion is made 
at the first stage. 
6 Timely detection and the retreat option 
After 'calibrating' our game theoretical model, by deriving the WMUF test as part 
of the solution of a special case, we turn now back to the general model presented in 
section 3. Our object is to take now into account the two features which make the 
model 'truly sequential' namely, 
e The importance of timely detection, which is captured by the extra-penalty 
function d(m). This isanegative payoff -d(m) incurred by the inspector for a 
diversion of m at the first stage. 
• The option of the operator to make a decision after the first stage of the game 
whether to go on with his diversionplan or to retreat since it looks too risky to 
do so in view of the first stage inspection ( MJF t). 
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These two elements of the model are linked naturally together; The option of the 
inspector to make decisions in the process of the game i.e., to call an alarm at any 
stage, existed already in the static model treated in section 2 and the special case of 
the sequential model treated in section 5. The fact that it turns out that the inspector 
does not call an alarm before the end of the game, is a feature of the solution which 
is due to the assumption that time is not important which is, d( m) = 0. If we depart 
from this assumption, as we shall see, the inspector will use his option to call an alarm 
in the first stage ( that is c1 < oo) and it is most natural to provide the operator with 
a similar option to reconsider his situation and decide about his moves after each 
stage of the game. 
We shall first write down the equilibrium equations for the general model which 
turn out to be rather complex and hardly manageable analytically. In view of that 
we take a special simple case of payoff functions which is 'the simplest change' of 
the payoff structure in section 5 incorporating the above mentioned new elements. 
This will also allow an easy comparison between the two models and hence an easy 
measure of the effect of these two 'sequential' elements. 
6.1 Equilibrium equations 
By virtue of Theorems 4.1 - 4.3, as long as we are interested only in the study of 
equilibria, the a priori huge sets of strategies can be reduced to strategies of rather 
simple forms: The inspector strategies are, as before, a pair s = ( c1 , c2( ·)) of first and 
second stage threshold for alarm. A strategy of the operatorisapair t = (q, m*(·)) 
where q E ~[0, 1] is a probability distribution of m- the quantity which he diverts at 
the first stage, and m*(·) is a threshold function m*: n-[o, 1] tobe used as follows: 
If m was diverted at the first stage and the observed MJF 1 was x1 : 
• Retreat if m*(xt) < m. 
e Complete diversion (i.e., divert 1-m) if m*(x1) ~ m. 
Even after this restriction of the strategies, the corresponding sets S and T are 
still too large and it is impractical to find an equilibrium directly from the definition: 
I(s, t) ~ I(s', t) Vs' E S 
O(s, t) ~ O(s, t') Vt' E T. 
We therefore derive some simpler equations to be satisfied by the equilibrium strate-
gies. These equations are derived not directly from the definition but rather from the 
following simple property of the equilibrium strategies: If in equilibrium a player is 
indifferent between two actions, it must be that the two actions yield him the same 
expected payoff. In particular if he randomizes between two actions, he must be 
indifferent between them ( since otherwise he should use only the preferred action) 
and hence they both yield the same (maximal) expected payoff. Using this simple 
principle we have the following: 
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e Given that 0 has already diverted the amount m, the value Xt was observed 
and I did not call analarm (since x1 < c1), then 0 has two alternatives: Either 
to retreat (R), in which case his expected payoff is (denoting 0' = 0'2\/1- p2) 
O(R I m, xt) = 6(m),P ( o..(x,~- l'o) ~ b(m) [ 1 - 4> ( c,(x,~- l'o)] 
which is 
O(R Im, Xt) = -b(m) + (S(m) + b(m))cP ( c2(xt! -~-Lo), 
or to complete the diversion (D) in which case his expected payoff is 
O(D Im, Xt) = -b + (1 + b)cP ( c2(xt~- /-Lt) . 
Now, at the threshold m = m*(xt) the operator is indifferent between these two 
alternatives hence O(R I m*(xt), x1) = O(D I m*(xt), x1) from which we have 
that the equation 
(1 + b)cP ( c2(Xt~- 1-lt) = (b ~ b(m)) + (S(m) + b(m))cP ( c2(Xt~ -1-Lo) (19) 
has tobe satisfied at m = m*(x1). 
o When 0 chooses a certain diversion m he will later, depending on the value 
of x1 choose R or D and receive the higher of O(R Im, Xt) and O(D Im, Xt)· 
Therefore his expected payoff (before observing x1 ) is 
where M(m, x1) stands for: 
max { -b(m) + (6(m) + (m ))4> ( o,(x,~- l'o) , ~b+ (1 + b),P ( c,(x,~- l't)} . 
lt follows that support of the distribution q( m) must be contained in the set 
of maximizers of the function in ( 20). In particular if this function attains its 
maximum at finitely many points m, then only these values of m can have a 
positive q probability. 
• Consider the second stage decision of the inspector: If x1 < c1 was observed 
at the first stage and x 2 = c2(x1) at the second stage, then by the definition of 
c2(·) (and the continuity of the payoff functions in c2), the inspector should be 
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indifferent between calling or not calling an alarm. Hence the two actions yield 
in that case the same expected payoff i.e., 
which is 
J;'*(a:t)-(a(m)- F(m))t,om(Xt)e -l( C2C"t)-eo r d](m) -
f!•(a:t)(F- a)t,om(Xt)e -!( eaCa:y-"1 r d](m). (21) 
• Finally consider I 's decision at the first stage. If x1 = c1 is observed then, by 
the definition of Ct, the inspector is indifferent between calling or not calling an 
alarm at the first stage since both alternatives yield the same expected payoff 
that is: 
- J~ a(m)d](m I Xt = c.) = 
- J~ d(m)d](m I Xt = ct) 
- Jom•(ct)- [a(m) (1 - tP ( c2(c~-~Ao)) + F(m)tP (C2(ctj-~Ao)] d](m I Xt = Ct) 
- f!•(cl) [a (1- tP (C2(c~-~At )) + FtP (C2(c~-~At )] d](m I Xt = Ct), 
which can be also written as: 
J~ d(m)t,om(st) d](m) -
J;'*(sl)-(a(m)- a)t,om(ct) d](m) 
- Jom*(ct)-[F(m)- a(m))tP(C2(ctJ-~Ao)<,om(ct) d](m) 
- f!•(c
1
)[F- a]tP(C2(c~-~At )<,om(ct) d](m) . 
(22) 
The four conditions ( 19) to ( 22) are to be satisfied at any equilibrium point 
(s, t). However thesearenot straightforward equations to solve and there is no hope 
for closed analytic solutions. 
As a first step we start with a special and relatively simple set of parameters we 
introduced in Assumption 5.1 except that ( iii) is replaced by 
(iii') d(m) = d · m \Im E [0, 1], 
where d > 0 that is, we are assuming the extra darnage due to late detection to be 
linear in the amount m diverted in the first period. 
Except for providing a simple case to start with, the adoption of Assumptions 5.1 
will enable us to compare the equilibria in the two models and see the effect of the 
two new features namely, the importance of time ( expressed by the linear function 
dm) and the possibility of the operator to retreat from a diversion move he started 
with. 
24 
Under·the above assumptions the four equilibrium conditions take somewhat sim-
pler forms, namely, 
~ ( c2(x1)-:t(m,xt)) 
~ ( c2(xt)-:o(m, xr)) 
b = 
1 
+ b at m = m*(xt) Vxt E n . · (23) 
The second condition is that the support of the distribution q( m) must be con-
tained in the set of maximizers of the function G(m) given by: 
G(~) - -b + [~ max { b~ ( c,(x,~- po) , (1 + b)~ ( c,(x,!- fll)} \l'm(x1) dJ:1 ,
(24) 
The third equatjon becomes: 
a lm•(xi)- <t'm(Xt)e -!( ~(a:~)-l'o r d](m) 
Finally. the last equation is: 
a JJ m<,om(ct) d-J(m) = 
a JJ:"•(cl)- ~( c2(c1J-tto )<,om( Ct) d-J( m) ,_ (1 - a) J~•(ci) ~( c2(c~-ttl )cpm( Ct) d-J(m) . 
(26) 
6.2 Partial results 
The major difficulty in attempting to solve equations (23) to (26) is the fact that 
one of the "unknowns" is a probability distribution q on [0, 1] which determines the 
first period diversion. In spite of richness of the set from which q can be chosen, we 
strongly conjecture that in equilibrium, q belongs to a much smaller (and hence more 
manageable) set of distributions namely, the support of q consists of only two values 
of m, one of which is m = 0. First we can prove that this distribution is the simplest 
possible, that is: 
Theorem f;).l There is no equilibrium in which q is singular distribution which as-
signs probability 1 to some value m E [0, 1]. 
The proof which is rather lengthy and technical is given in Appendix 8.5. 
Assurne that in the strategy of 0 the probability distribution q is of finite support. 
That is consider . 0 's strategies in which the first period diversion can take one of 
the values ( m1, m2, ... , mn) with probabilities ( q1, q2, ... , qn) respectively. Assurne 
without loss of generality that 0 ~ m1 < m2 < ... < mn ~ 1. For this to be part 
of an equilibrium strategy, the second period behavior is given by a set of critical 
values xi, x;, . .. , x~ with the interpretation that given that mi was diverted at the 
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first period, then if x1 ~ xt, divert 1-mi at the second period, otherwise retreat from 
the diversion plan. Furthermore, since x*(m) is increasing in m (by Theorem 4.2) we 
have: xi < x; < ... < x~. We draw some conclusions about an equilibrium involving 
this type of strategy. 
To begin with, is it possible that xi > -oo ? This would mean that in the event 
-oo < x1 ~ xi there is a sure completion of diversion at the second period. The 
best reply to this is a sure alarm (at first or second period). This of course cannot be 
the situation in equilibrium (since 0 would increase his payoff by retreating in this 
event.) 
On the other hand, xi = -oo and m > 0 means that with positive probability 
qh a positive amount is diverted in the first period, followed by a sure retreat at the 
second period. This gain cannot be the situation in equilibrium since replacing m1 by 
0 would decrease the false alarm probability and hence increase 0 's payoff (recall 
that 0 has no positive utility from total diversion less than 1.) We conclude that: 
• In equilibrium it must be the case that m1 = 0, q1 > 0 and xi = oo. That is, 
with positive probability 0 does not divert at the first period and then surely 
does not divert at the second period. In other words: With positive probability 
he behaves legally. 
Considering now the other end, x~ < oo means that whenever Xt > x~ it is certain 
that 0 will not complete the diversion at the second period. It is impossible that 
when x1 > x: is observed, I does not call an alarm at the first period and does call 
an alarm at the second period. (Since he knows with certainty that no additional 
diversionwas made at the second period, if he decides to call analarm at the second 
period, he is better off doing it at the first period and saving the element dm.) So 
there are two possibilities: 
• I does not call an alarm (in either period) whenever Xt > Xn*, or 
• I calls an alarm at the first period whenever x1 > Xn*· \-~ \ 
The firstalternative means c2(x1) = oo for all x 1 > Xn*· But since c2 is decreasing 
in Xt (by Theorem 4.1), it follows that c2 = oo i.e., I never calls an alarm at the 
second period which of course cannot be the case in equilibrium. 
The second alternative means t.hat c1 ~ x:. In such a case, there is no loss of 
generality in assuming c1 = Xn*· In fact if c1 < x:, nothing is changed if we replace x: by c1 (since the threshold x• is relevant only when there is no alarm at the first 
period.) 
This discussion is summarized as follows: 
Proposition 6.2 In equilibrium in which q has a finite support, there is a positive 
probability for legal action {m1 = 0 and xi = -oo) and the first period I threshold, 
Ct is also the threshold for 0 's completion if he has diverted the largest amount mn. 
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6.3 The one-diversion plan equilibrium 
In view of our result that no equilibrium exists with a singular q, the simplest case to 
consider isthat in which the support of q consists of two points. By the conciusion of 
the previous section this support must be {0, m} with the corresponding completion 
thresholds being -oo and c1• Thus the equilibrium has the following structure: 
• The operator behaves legally (in both periods) with probability q and with 
probability 1 - q he diverts m at the first period and complefes the diversion 
at the second period if no alarm was called before. 
• The inspector uses a two period threshold strategy s = (ct, c2 ) which is to call 
an alarm at the first period if x1 > c1 and otherwise to call an alarm at the 
second period if X2 > c2(xt)• 
The interesting thing about this conclusion is that in no event does the operator 
retreat after starting a diversion plan. Although he has this option, he does not use it 
in equilibrium in which q has a two points support. But now this equilibrium becomes 
very similar, in structure, to the equilibrium found in Section 5 where we assumed 
that there is no possibility for 0 to retreat. 
The conditions to determine the equilibrium strategies r = ( q, m) and s = ( Ct, c2) 
are similar except that now we will not be able to conclude that c1 = oo: Because of 
the "time value term" .dm we must find c1 < oo that is, the inspector may well call 
an alarm at the first period. 
The equilibrium conditions are equations (12), (13) and (14) as in the previous 
section and a fourth equation is the analog of equation (15) which incorporate the 
factor dm. It is more convenient to write this equation differently, expressing the 
fact that at x1 = c1 , the inspector is indifferent between calling an alarm ( at the first 
period) or not: 
a(l-q(m I c,))q, ( s,(ct) ~ p~c,) = q(m I c,) [dm + (1- a)</> ( s,(ct)-:,(m,c,))], 
. (27) 
where 
-~(c1-m)2 qe 2a1 
q(m I Ct) = 1 1 ~ -~(c1-m)2 -:::::2" 1 
qe 2a1 + (1- q)e 2a1 
is the conditional probability of diversion given x1 = Ct. 
Equation (14) provided the function c2 (given by Equations (36), (37), (38) and 
(39) in Section 8.4), we are left actually with three unknowns Ct, q, and m to be 
found by solving the three equations (12) (13) and (27). These equations were solved 
numerically and the results are given in the next section. 
6.4 Numerical results 
The one-diversion plan equilibrium developed in the previous section was computed 
by solving numerically equations (12), (13) and (27) (with c2 given by Equations (36), 
(37), (38) and (39). 
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Input 
The input of the numerical procedure consists of the statistical distribution pa-
rameters: t11, t12 and p, and the payoff parameters: b ( alarm penalty) for the operator, 
a (alarm penalty) and d time element for the inspector. 
Output 
The output is an equilibrium point, which consists of a pair of strategies: q and m 
for the operator and Ct a.nd c2(·) for the inspector. From these we computed several 
characteristics of the equilibrium, the most interesting of which are: 
e FAP - The false alarm probability. 
• ß The probability of no detection, given that a diversion took place (type II 
error). 
• Q = qß - The probability that a diversion will take pla.ce and will not be 
detected. · 
• I- The expected payoff of the inspector. 
e 0 - The expected payoff of the operator. 
We were interested in the dependence of the equilibrium on the payoff parameters 
(penalties) b- of the operator and a- of the inspector. All computations were made 
for several values of the 'time factor' parameter d. The results are given by the tables 
in the following tables which are self explanatory: In all cases we took t11 = t12. Each 
line in the table corresponds to a game in which a, b, d and p a.re given a.t the heading 
of the table and the left column. The other numbers on the line correspond to the 
resulting equilibrium. Recall that 0 is the coefficient of x1 in c2. In other words, the 
statistics of the second period test is x2 + Ox1• According to the results of Section 5, 
0 = 1 when d = 0 (i.e., no importance for timely detection.) 
In the first table the solution is given for varying values of b - the operator's 
'penalty' resulting from an alarm. 
28 
Table 2: The Equilibrium solution for varying values of b. 
a = o.8 d = o.o5 P = -0.6 I 
b Ct q m (} FAP ß Q I 0 
0.4 1.0388 0.8655 0.36 0.8692 0.4962 0.1439 0.12455 -0.7824 -0.1985 
0.8' 1.9448 0.7725 0.46 0.9608 0.2503 0.3332 0.25740 -0.7316 -0.2002 
1.2 2.4989 0.7036 0.49 0.9900 0.1550 0.4609 0.32429 -0.6813 -0.1860 
1.6 2.9191 0.6503 0.50 1.0000 0.1075 0.5492 0.35714 -0.6379 ·-0.1720 
2.0 3.2836 0.6078 0.5 1.0000 0.0799 0.6134 0.37282 -0.6011 -0.1599 
2.4 3.5720 0.5730 0.5 1.0000 0.0624 0.6619 0.37927 -0.5699 -0.1496 
2.8 3.8089 0.5438 0.5 1.0000 0.0503 0.6998 0.38055 -0.5431 -0.1409 
3.2 4.0089 0.5189 0.5 1.0000 0.0417 0.7301 0.37885 -0.5199 -0.1335 
3.6 4.1812 0.4974 0.5 1.0000 0.0353 0.7550 0.37554 -0.4996 -0.1270 
4.0 4.3322 0.4785 0.5 1.0000 0.0303 0.7757 0.37117 -0.4817 -0.1213 
4.4 4.4663 0.4618 0.5 1.0000 0.0264 0.7933 0.36635 -0.4656 -0.1164 
4.8 4.5866 0.4469' 0.5 1.0000 0.0233 0.8083 0.36123 -0.4513 -0.1119 
5.2 4.6955 0.4335 0.5 1.0000 0.0208 0.8213 0.35603 -0.4382 -0.1079 
5.6 4.7949 0.4213 0.5 1.0000 0.0186 0.8327 0.35082 -0.4264 -0.1044 
6.0 4.8862 0.4102 0.5 1.0000 0.0168 0.8427 0.34568 -0.4155 -0.1011 
a = 0.8 d = 0.2 p = -0.6 
b Ct q m (} FAP ß Q I 0 
0.4 0.5128 0.8587 0.18 0.7241 0.5675 0.1233 0.10588 -0.7918 -0.2273 
1.0 1.5022 0.7273 0.36 0.8692 0.2195 0.3902 0.28379 -0.7323 -0.2195 
1.6 2.0175 0.6445 0.42 0.9231 0.1170 0.5434 0.35022 -0.6701 -0.1872 
2.0 2.2688 0.6035 0.44 0.9417 0.0851 0.6099 0.36807 -0.6347 -0.1704 
2.4 2.4316 0.5694 0.46 0.9.608 0.0658 0.6594 0.37546 -0.6044 -0.1579 
2.8 2.6029 0.5411 0.47 0.9704 0.0525 0.6982 0.37780 -0.5777 -0.1469 
3.3 2.7779 0.5113 0.48 0.9802 0.0412 0.7358 0.37621 -0.5489 -0.1360 
3.6 2.9064 0.4958 0.48 0.9802 0.0361 0.7543 0.37398 -0.5333 -0.1300 
4.1 3.0155 0.4729 0.49 0.9900 0.0299 0.7799 0.36881 -0.5108 -0.1225 
4.4 3.1146 0.4608 0.49 0.9900 0.0269 0.7929 0.36537 -0.4983 -0.1182 
4.8 3.2354 0.4462 0.49 0.9900 0.0236 0.8081 0.36057 -0.4831 -0.1132 
5.6 3.3598 0.4208 0.5 1.0000 0.0188 0.8325 0.35032 -0.4574 -0.1054 
6.0 3.4501 0.4098 0.5 1.0000 0.0170 0.8426 0.34530 -0.4458 -0.1019 
29 
a = 0.8 d = 0.6 p = -0.6 
b Cl q m () FAP ß Q I 
0.4 0.2657 0.8539 0.07 0.6461 0.6186 0.1091 0.09316 -0.7948 
0.6 0.6181 0.7981 0.14 0.6949 0.4548 0.2050 0.16361 -0.7905 
0.9 0.9804 0.7331 0.20 0.7391 0.3041 0.3296 0.24163 -0.7685 
1.3 1.3273 0.6684 0.26 0.7857 0.1930 0.4562 0.30492 -0.7362 
2.0 1.7171 0.5897 0.32 0.8349 0.1060 0.5961 0.35152 -0.6809 
2.4 1.8982 0.5570 0.34 0.8519 0.0800 0.6494 0.36172 -0.6532 
2.8 2.0098 0.5292 0.36 0.8692 0.0642 0.6896 0.36494 -0.6291 
3.1 2.1043 0.5114 0.37 0.8779 0.0546 0.7148 0.36555 -0.6124 
3.5 2.2196 0.4906 0.38 0.8868 0.0450 0.7427 0.36437 -0.5919 
3.8 2.2762 0.4765 0.39 0.8957 0.0398 0.7601 0.36219 -0.5785 
4.3 2.3882 0.4560 0.40 0.9048 0.0327 0.7848 0.35787 -0.5575 
4.8 2.4723 0.4382 0.41 0.9139 0.0276 0.8048 0.35266 -0.5391 
5.2 2.5277 0.4254 0.42 0.9231 0.0244 0.8183 0.34810 -0.5264 
5.5 2.5887 0.4168 0.42 0.9231 0.0222 0.8274 0.34486 -0.5163 
6.0 2.6376 0.4031 0.43 0.9324 0.0195 0.8406 0.33885 -0.5022 
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Figure 6: Diversion probability q and the probability Q of undetected diversion 

















Here we see that although the diversion probability q decreases as the penalty b 
30 
gets larger, the total probability of overlooked diversion increases in b for low values 
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Figure 7: The false alarm probability a (FAP) and type II error probability ß 
as functions of the penalty b. 
The interesting thing in this figure is that ß increases as the penalty b increases. 
This is because q decreases i.e., the operator commits much less violations and con-









d = 0.60 .... 
o+-----------------------~~~--~ 
0 
False Alarm Prob. ( a) 
1 
Figure 8: The relation between ß and a resultiong from varying the penalty value b. 
Here we see the classical dependence of the probabilities of first and second type 
errors. Note that each game corresponds to a single point on this line. To obtain the 
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Figure 9: The first period threshold for alarm, c1, as a function of the penalty b. 
As expected, the higher is the penalty b the less likely it is for the inspector to 
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Figure 10: The amount m diverted at the first periodas a function of the penalty b. 
The influence of the penalty b on the amount m diverted at the first period is 
non significant in a large range of b. Recall that with no time element (d = 0), the 
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Figure 11: The inspector's expected payoff I, and the operator's expected payoff 0 
as functions of the penalty b. 
lnterestingly, the expected payoffs of both players increase as b incteases. 'rhis is 
true for the inspector on the whole region, while for the Operator this is the case except 
for very low values of b. Note the all payoffs are negative although if the Operator 
would behave legally and the inspector would never call an alarm, the payoff would 
be higher namely zero for both. However,. this is not a stable situation. 
As for the effect of the time factor d on the solution, we see that it has non 
significant effect on the 'performance' of the equilibrium as measured by FAP, ß, q 
and Q. It does affect however both players' strategies namely Ct, and m. 
The following table contains the solutions for varying vah,tes pf the inspector's 
disutility, a, from an alarm. 
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Table 3: The Equilibrium solution for varying values of a. 
b = 1.2 d = 0.05 p = -0.6 
a Ct q m ' 9 FAP ß Q I 0 
0.100 3.7005 0.0621 0.5 1 0.1534 0.4618 0.02868 -0.0480 -0.1840 
0.150 3.6562 0.0951 0.5 1 0.1534 0.4618 0.04392 -0.0748 -0.1841 
0.200 3.6086 0.1296 0.5 1 0.1534 0.4618 0.05985 -0.1038 -0.1840 
0.250 3.5578 0.1657 0.5 1 0.1534 0.4618 0.07652 -0.1349 -0.1841 
0.300 3.5030 0.2034 0.5 1 0.1534 0.4618 0.09393 -0.1685 -0.1841 
0.350 3.4437 0.2429 0.5 1 0.1534 0.4618 0.11217 -0.2046 -0.1841 
0.400 3.3791 0.2843 0.5 1 0.1534 0.4618 0.13129 -0.2435 -0.1841 
0.450 3.3082 0.3277 0.500 1.0000 0.1534 0.4618 0.15133 -0.2853 -0.1841 
0.500 3.2298 0.3733 0.500 1.0000 0.1535 0.4618 0.17239 -0.3302 -0.1841 
0.550 3.1421 0.4213 0.500 1.0000 0.1535 0.4617 0.19451 -0.3786 -0.1842 
0.600 3.0428 0.4718 0.500 1.0000 0.1536 0.4617 0.21783 -0.4306 -0.1843 
0.650 2.9287 0.5250 0.500 1.0000 0.1537 0.4616 0.24234 -0.4866 -0.1844 
0.700 2.8316 0.5813 0.495 0.9950 0.1539 0.4615 0.26827 -0.5467 -0.1846 
0.800 2.5333 0.7036 0.485 0.9851 0.1548 0.4610 0.32436 -0.6812 -0.1858 
0.850 2.3243 0.7702 0.475 0.9753 0.1564 0.4602 0.35445 -0.7561 -0.1877 
0.900 2.0737 0.8408 0.450 0.9512 0.1601 0.4581 0.38517 -0.8361 -0.1921 
b = 1.2 d = 0.2 p = -0.6 
a Ct q m 9 FAP ß Q I 0 
0.050 2.6576 0.0303 0.490 0.9900 0.1543 0.4613 0.01398 -0.0252 -0.1852 
0.100 2.6079 0.0619 0.490 0.9900 0.1545 0.4612 0.02855 -0.0523 -0.1854 
0.150 2.5551 0.0948 0.490 0.9900 0.1547 0.4611 0.04371 -0.0815 -0.1857 
0.200 2.5333 0.1292 0.485 0.9851 0.1548 0.4610 0.05956 -0.1127 -0.1858 
0.250 2.4723 0.1651 0.485 0.9851 0.1552 0.4608 0.07608 -0.1463 -0.1862 
0.300 2.4407 0.2026 0.480 0.9802 0.1554 0.4607 0.09334 -0.1822 -0.1865 
0.350 2.3691 0.2417 0.480 0.9802 0.1560 0.4604 0.11128 -0.2209 -0.1872 
0.400 2.3243 0.2828 0.475 0.9753 0.1564 0.4602 0.13014 -0.2621 -0.1877 
0.450 2.2711 0.3258 0.470 0.9704 0.1570 0.4598 0.14980 -0.3062 -0.1884 
0.500 2.2079 0.3709 0.465 0.9656 0.1578 0.4594 0.17039 -0.3534 ~0.1893 
0.600 2.0737 0.4681 0.450 0.9512 0.1601 0.4581 0.21444 -0.4577 -0.1921 
0.650 1.9947 0.5206 0.440 0.9417 0.1620 0.4571 0.23797 -0.5152 -0.1943 
0.700 1.9216 0.5759 0.425 0.9277 0.1640 0.4560 0.26261 -0.5763 -0.1969 
0.800 1.7085 0.6961 0.385 0.8913 0.1729 0.4511 0.31401 -0.7104 -0.2075 
0.850 1.5860 0.7619 0.350 0.8605 0.1805 0.4470 0.34057 -0.7828 -0.2167 
0.875 1.5023 0.7961 0.330 0.8433 0.1865 0.4444 0.35379 -0.8203 -0.2227 
0.925 1.3080 0.8694 0.265 0.7897 0.2060 0.4344 0.37767 -0.8966 -0.2447 
34 
b = 1.2 d = 0.6 p = -0.6 
a Ct q m () FAP ß Q I 
0.100 1.9216 0.0607 0.425 0.9277 0.1640 0.4560 0.02768 -0.0609 
0.150 1.8893 0.0930 0.420 0.9231 0.1651 0.4554 0.04235 -0.0942 
0.200 1.8522 0.1265 0.415 0.9185 0.1664 0.4547 0.05752 -0.1295 
0.300 1.7914 0.1983 0.400 0.9048 0.1691 0.4530 0.08983 -0.2067 
0.350 1.7474 0.2362 0.395 0.9002 0.1708 0.4525 0.10688 -0.2489 
0.400 1.7085 0.2763 0.385 0.8913 0.1729 0.4511 0.12464 -0.2933 
0.450 1.6684 0.3182 0.375 0.8824 0.1752 0.4499 0.14316 -0.3402 
0.550 1.5864 0.4084 0.350 0.8605 0.1805 0.4470 0.18255 -0.4420 
0.600 1.5339 0.4572 0.335 0.8476 0.1846 0.4446 0.20327 -0.4971 
0.700 1.4081 0.5626 0.300 0.8182 0.1956 0.4389 0.24693 -0.6155 
0.750 1.3517 0.6194 0.280 0.8018 0.2006 0.4377 0.27111 -0.6789 
0.825 1.2515 0. 7133 0.240 0.7699 0.2117 0.4336 0.30929 -0.7794 
0.875 1.1192 0.7849 0.190 0.7316 0.2337 0.4191 0.32895 -0.8456 
0.900 1.0352 0.8237 0.155 0.7058 0.2505 0.4075 0.33566 -0.8767 
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Figure 12: Diversionprobability q and the probability Q of undetected diversion 
as functions of a. 
As expected, the higher is a the higher is the probability of violation (both detected 
and undetected), since the inspector is reluctant to call an alarm and sure enough, 
the operator takes advantage of this situation. Note, however, that the quality of the 
inspector's test, as measured by a (FAP) and ß, is not affected by a. This is seen in 
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Figure 13: The false alarm probability a (FAP) and type li error probability ß 
as functions of a. 
The next figure shows that threshold for calling alarm at the first period, ( c1), 
decreases mildly in a. So although alarm is more painful for the inspector, he applies 
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Figure 14: The first period threshold for alarm, Ct 
as a function of a. 
The effect of a and d on the mass m diverted at first period and on the players' 
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Figure 15: The amount m diverted at the first period 
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Figure 16: The inspector's expected payoff I, and the operator's expected payoff 0 
as functions of a. 
The inspector's expected utility decreases in a while that of the operator is prac-
tically independent of a. This is another expression of the non zero-sum nature of 
the game. 
Here again we see that although d has a significant effect on the equilibrium 
strategies, it has negligible effect on the performance characteristics of the outcome. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
On deterrence strategies 
Our result that in any equilibrium the operator must be choosing legal behavior with 
positive probability, has a very interesting and practically important consequence to 
our problem. Consider the variant of the game, in which the operator announces 
his strategy in advance and commits hirnself to use it. Such a game is called an 
inspector leadership game and it was treated in Avenhaus, .Okada and Zamir 
(1990). We proved there that the only equilibrium of this game is one in which 
the operator plays legally ( even though he is indifferent between playing legally or 
not). In other words, although the operator's equilibrium payoff is the same in both 
games, the diversion probability q is zero in the leadership game and consequently 
the equilibrium payoff of the inspector is higher. 
. Although this result is appealing, the operator is still not deterred from illegal 
action since he is indifferent. However, if the inspector uses inspection strategies 
which are slightly more severe than the equilibrium strategy (say s( = ( c1 - t:, c2 - €)), 
then the operator will strictly prefer legal behavior on illegal one, in other words, 
these are deterrence inspection strategies. 
More than two inventory periods 
Given the complexity of the solution, it was natural to restriet our solutions of the 
sequential model for only for two inventory periopds. However, we expect that most 
of the results can be genaralized for more than two inventory periods. More precisely 
we conjecture that: 
• We expect that for any number n of inventory periods, the equilibrium strate-
gies of both players will be threshold strategies. In other word, we expect a 
genalization of Theorems 4.1, Theorems 4.2, and Theorems 4.3 according to 
which, in equilibrium, at each period i, 
- The inspector calls an alarm if and only if the current MJF i is greater 
than a critical value Ci which depends on all previous MJF values. 
- The operator's diversion depends on the previous MJF values and he re-
treats from his diversion plans if MlF i exceeds a certain critical value. 
• With the analogue of Assumption 5.1, a theorem similar to Theorem 5.4 should 
be proveable that is, the theshold values of the inspector's strategy are: 
n-1 
Ct = ... = Cn-1 = oo and Cn =G-E MJF i 1 
1 
for some constant G. 
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8 Appendix 
In the proofs we need the following assumption on the joint distribution of (Xt,X2): 
Assumption 8.1 max (-!!!., -~) < p < 0. 
0'2 0'1 -
This condition is satisfied in our case since 
and assuming that /i and Di are pairwise independent it follows that 
Cov(M.JF~,MJF 2 ) = -Var(/1 ) < 0, implying p < 0. Also 
u: = Var(MJF t) - Var(Io) + Var(Dt) + Var(/t) 
> Var(It) = -Cov(M.JF' t, MJF 2) = -pu1u2 
which implies p 2:: -u1/u2 • Similarly 
u~ = Var(MJF 2) ;:::: Var(/t) = -pu1u2, 
which implies p ;:::: -u2/ O't. 
Next we need the following general property of the cumulative standard normal 
distribution 
Lemma 8.2 For any 8 > 0, the ratio 4>(y- 8)/4>(y) is strictly increasing in y for 
all y E ( -oo, oo) with 
lim 4>(Y- 8) = 0 and lim 4>(y- 8) = 1. 
y-+-oo 4>(y) y-+oo 4>(y) 
Proof The limit of this ratio as y ___. oo is 1 since this is the limit of both nurnerator 
and denorninator. The second lirnit is verified using L'Hospital's rule: 
1. 4>(Y- 8) . e-t(y-6)2 = lt'rn e2y6-62 = 0. 1m A-( ) = hrn 1 2 y-+-oo 'I' y y-+-oo e- 2 11 11-+-oo 
The condition 
j_ (4>(Y- 8)) > 0 
dy 4>(y) 
is equivalent to 
which is 
G(y) ~c 4>(Y) e(2y6- .s22) > 1 V 4>(Y -8) y. (28) 
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To prove (28) we show: 
lim G(y) - 1 
v-+-oo 
G'(y) > 0 Vy. 
The first is proved by L'Hospital's rule: 
. e-h2 e<2v6-f> - ö<f>(y) e<v6- 6;) 
v~~oo G(y) - v~~oo e-!(v-6)2 · 
- v~~oo ( 1 + 6 e~(~~ ) = 1 
(In the last step we again used L'Hospital's rule: 
. To prove (30) we have 
G'(y) > 0 ~ (ln G(y))' > 0 
</>'(y) - 4>'(y- 8) + 8 > 0 
</>(y) <f>(y - 8) 
1 1 +6>0 
R( -y) R( -y + 6) 
j_~vH d~ (n~uJ du< 8 
Here R(z) is the Mill's ratio defined by, 
1 - 4>( z) 4>(- z) 4>(- z) 
R(z) = </>'( -z) = </>'(z) = 4>'(-z) 
which implies 
4>' ( z) 1 
</>(z) = R( -z) · 
Recall now the following property of the Mill's ratio (see Owen (1980)): 
0 < :z (n~z)) < 1 Vz, 
(29) 
(30) 
This implies the last inequality concerning the integral of this derivative, completing 
the proof of the Iemma. 
Corollary 8.3 For any 0 < "1 < 1 and any 8 > 01 there is a unique Z = Z(8) 
satisfying 
</>(Z(ö)- 8) 
4>( z ( 6)) = "1· (31) 
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Lemma 8.4 For any TJ E (0, 1), the function Z(8) defined by Corollary 8.9 is strictly 
increasing in 8 at all 8 E ( -oo, oo). 
Proof Differentiating both sides of equation (31), with respect to 8, we get: 
4>(Z(8))<P'(Z(8)- 8)(Z'(8)- 1)- </J(Z(8)- 8)</J'(Z(8))Z'(8) _ O 
</J2(Z(8)) - ' 
which is equivalent to: 
4>'(Z(8)- 8)(Z'(8)- 1) = TJ<P'(Z(8))Z'(8) 
or 
or 
Z'(8) (e6Z(6)-~62 _ TJ) = e6Z(6)-~6:a 
Since the right hand side of the last equation is always positive, Z'(8) cannot 
vanish and hence cannot change sign, therefore it is enough to show that it is positive 
for some 8, or equivalently, it remains to show the existence of 8 > 0 for which 
exp{8Z(8)- l82 } > TJ· In fact choose any 8 > 0 large enough so as to satisfy 
<P( -8/2)/4>(8/2) < 77 and let us show that such 8 satisfies the desired inequality: 
<P(-~) - <P(~- 8) < t1 
<P(i) - 4>(i) .,. 
Since 4>(Z + 8)/</J(Z) is increasing and reaching 77 at Z = Z(8) it follows that 
Z ( 8) > 8/2. Consequently, the interval [ Z ( 8) - 8, Z ( 8)] lies to the right of the interval 
[-8/2, 8/2) (which is of the same length) and therefore the center of (Z(8)- 8, Z(8)] 
lies to the right of 0 (see Figure 17). 
0 
Z(8)- 8 Z(8) 
Figure 17: The density of the Standard Normal Distribution. 
By the symmetry of the normal density cp, this implies cp(Z(8)- 8) > cp(Z(8)) and 
finally we have: 
e6Z(6)-t6a = cp(Z(8)- 8) > 1 > TJ 
cp(Z(8)) ' 
completing the proof of the Lemma. 
111 
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8.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1 
Denote by Z the random variable which is the total diversion of material in the 
two periods and denote its cumulative distribution (which depends of course on the 
strategies) by Q. We first prove: 
Proposition 8.5 For any pair of strategies (s, t) and for any given x1, the condi-
tional distribution Q(Z I x1, x2) is stochastically increasing in X2 for fixed Xt and 
stochastically increasing in Xt for fixed x2. 
Proof Weshall prove that V() E [0, 1] the probability P(Z < z I x11 x2) decreases 
in x2 and strictly decreases whenever it is not 0 or 1. 




- p-(xt- m) 
O't 
0'2 
- 1-m+ p-(xt- m) =1-m+ Jlo(m, Xt) 
O't 
P(Z < I ) _ fto,z)<t':ct(m)(1-p(m,xt))<,Ow2 (P,o(m,xt))dq(m) 
z Xt, x2 - /to,t) <,Ow1 (m )[(1- p(m, Xt)) <,Om2 (p.o(m, Xt)) + p(m, Xt) <,Ow2 (P.t ( m, Xt) )] dq(m) 
Since <,Om1 (m) and <,Om2 (J.t) are always strictly positive it follows that if P(Z < z I x11 x2) 
equals 0 or 1 for one value of x2 then it is constant in x2 and hence (weakly) decreasing. 
Let us therefore assume that it is neither 0 nor 1 and prove that it strictly decreasing, 
or equivalently that its reciprocal is strictly increasing. We write it as 
where 
P(Z <:I Xt,x2) = 1 + ft(xt,x2) + h(xt,x2) 
Jrz,t]<t'mt(m)(1- p(m,xt))<,Ow2 (J.'o(m,xt)) dq(m) 
- f[o,z) <t'mt (m)(1 - p(m, Xt)) <,Ow2 (J.'o(m, Xt)) dq(m) 
i[o,t) <t'mt ( m) p( m, Xt) <,Om2 (J.tt ( m, Xt)) dq(m) 
Since P(Z < z I Xt,X2) < 1 not both ft(Xt,x2) = 0 and h(xt,x2) = 0. It is therefore 
sufficient to prove that for i = 1, 2, 
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Let e E [0, z) be any point in the support of the denominator of fi(Xt, X2)· 
If ft(xh x2) > 0 then 
Now formE [z, 1) 
frz,t] '{J:c1 (m) (1 - p(m, Xt)) '{Jm2 (1Jo(m, Xt)) dq(m) 
1 
'{Jw2(1to(m, Xt)) 
'fJa:a (~Jo( e' Xt)) 
Since p '< 0 and e < z ~ m, this function is increasing in each of the variables Xt and 
x2. Therefore so is the integral of such functions i.e., 1/ F(e, Xt, x2) is increasing in 
each of the variables Xi and hence F(e, Xt, x2) is decreasing in x2. Since 
and the integrand is increasing in Xi it follows that ft(xt,x2) is (strictly) increasing 
in Xi· 
The case h(xt, x2) > 0 is treated similarly: This time we have to show that 
'{Jw2(1Jt(m,xt))/cpa:2 (1Jo(e,xt)) strictly increases in Xi for all m E (0, 1]. In fact 
'{Jw2 (l't ( m, Xt)) 
tr'e:a (l'o( e, Xt)} 
Since by Assumption 8.1 
the coefficient of x2 is strictly positive and hence '{Ja:2 (1't (m, Xt) )/'fJw2 (Jto(e, Xt)) strictly 
increases in x 2 and also in x 1 (since p < 0), completing the proof of the Proposition. 
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In the next Proposition we prove that although A 2(x1 ) = n may also be con-
sidered as a threshold test in which the critical value is -oo, it will not occur in 
equilibrium. Intuitively, the reason is that since time is valuable, if the inspector is 
determined to call an alarm at second period independently of MJF 2, he should not 
wait but rather call the alarm at first period. 
Proposition 8.6 /f (s, t) is an equilibrium, then whenever Xt is not followed by a 
first period alarm, A2( Xt) ':/= n. 
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Proof lf A 2(x1) = n (and m < 1) then the operator's best reply is not to complete 
diversion at x1 (since b(m) < b.) Therefore Q(Z I xt) = q(m I x1) and the net 
difference in the I 's payoff between calling alarm at first period or in second period 
lS 
-1 a(z)dQ(z I Xt) + 1(A(m) + d(m))dq(m I Xt) = 1 d(m)dq(m I Xt)· 
This is always strictly positive unless q(m = 0 I xt) = 1 which can not be the case 
since if it was, the inspector's best reply would be not to call alarm at all. We 
conclude that the inspector is strictly better off calling the alarm at first period in 
contradiction to the fact that no alarm was called after x 1 • 
1111 
In the next Proposition we proye that sure diversion of critical mass can not be 
part of equilibrium. 
Proposition 8. 7 IJ ( s, t) is an equilibrium, then for almost all x1 
q({m: p(m,x1) = 1} I Xt) < 1. 
Pro of q( { m : p( m, xt) = 1} I xt) = 1 means that given x 11 the operator surely 
completes the critical diversion. Since -1 < -a, the inspector's best reply is to call 
an alarm at the second period if he did not call at the first one. Since -b < -b(m) 
for any m < 1, the operator's best reply to that is never to complete the diversion 
at second period. So the only way to satisfy q( { m : p( m, x1) = 1} I x1 ) = 1 is 
by q( { m = 1}) = 1 btit this can certainly not be part of an equilibrium. Since the 
inspector's best reply would be to call an alarm at first period to which the best reply 
is not to divert at all. 
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N ext we prove that for any MJF 1 , a certainty of not calling alarm at second period 
can not be part of an equilibrium. 
Proposition 8.8 If ( s, t) is an equilibrium then for almost all x 1 which were not 
followed by an alarm, C2 (xt) -:f n. 
Proof Since x2 has a continuous distribution, C2(Xt) = n means that given Xt 
the inspector will surely not call an alarm at second period. The best reply of the 
operator is p( m, Xt) = 1 , Vm, hence q( { m : p(m, Xt) = 1} I x1 ) = 1 in contradiction 
wi th Proposition 8. 7. 
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Corollary 8.9 If (s, t) is an equilibrium, then the conclusion in Proposition 8.5 can 
be strengthened as follows: Vz E [0, 1], the probability P(Z < z I Xt, x 2) decreases 
(weakly) in Xi and P(Z < 1 I x 11 x 2) strictly decreases in Xi. 
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Proof In the proof of Proposition 8.5 we showed that Vz E ·[0, 1), P(Z < z I Xt, x2) 
strictly decreases in Xi provided it is strictly between 0 and 1. So it is therefore 
sufficient to show that 0 < P(Z < 1 I x11 x2) < 1 for almost all (xl! x2). In fact 
P(Z < 11 x1,x2) = 0 means P(Z = 11 x1,x2) = 1 hence q({m: p(m,xt) = 1} I 
Xt) = 1 which cannot be the case in equilibrium by Proposition 8.7. 
Similarly P(Z < 1 I x11 x2) = 1 implies P(Z < 1 I Xt) = 1. Therefore ei-
ther C2(xt) = n which cannot be the case in equilibrium. By Proposition 8.8 or 
A2(xt) = n, which cannot be by Proposition 8.6. (If I is indifferent between the 
two possibilities, the operator can €-change his q to make it C 2(x1) = n and then 
complete diversion safely.) 
lil 
We are now in the position to condude the proof of. Theorem 4.1. 
Proof Given t = (q,p) and given x 1 and x2 , the conditional expected payoff for I 
if he calls an alarm is 
U(A2) = - f a(z) dQ(z I Xt, x2)- f d(m) dq(m I x~, x2) 
l[o,t] l[o,t) 
and if he does not call an alarm (i.e., chooses C2) it is 
U(C2) = - f F(z) dQ(z I Xt, x2)- f d(m) dq(m I x11 x2). 
J~D ~.D 
Therefore the net ( conditional) utility from calling an alarm is 
DI(x11x2) =: U(A2)- U(C2) = f (F(z)- a(z)) dQ(z I x11x2). 
l[o,t) 
By Corollary 8.9 this is a strictly increasing function of x2 (noting that the integrand 
is strictly increasing in m since F(m) is increasing and a(m) is decreasing.) It follows 
that for any .x1 after which no alarm was called at the first period, there is at most 
one critical value c2(x1) for which DI(x11 x2) = 0, that is: 
x2 < c2(xt) => U(A2) < U(C2) 
x2 > c2(x1) => U(A2) > U(C2). 
Such a value in fact exists since otherwise either C2(x1) = n or A2(xt) = n which 
cannot happen in equilibrium (Proposition 8.8 and Proposition 8.6.) 
To prove that c2(xt) is decreasing in x 1 recall that c2(xt) is the value of ·X2 for 
which the DI(x11x2) = O, and the difference DI(x11 x2) is strictly increasing in x2. 
It is therefore sufficient to prove that for fixed x2 , 
Xt > x~ => DI(xt, x2) > DI(xi, x2). 
To see this we have: 
- f (F(z)- a(z)) dQ(z I Xt, x2) 
J[o,t) 
- r (F(z)- a(z)) dQ(z I Xt, x2) + Q( {Z = 1} I Xt, X2)(1- a). 
J[o,t) 
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By Proposition 8.5, for all (} we have Q(Z < 0 I xi, x2) ;:::: Q(Z < 0 I X1, x2) and the 
inequality is strict for (} = 1 (Corollary 8.9.) Since F(m)- a(m) is increasing in m, 
it follows that for Xt > xi, 
{ (F(z)- a(z)) dQ(z I Xt,X2) > f (F(z)- a(z)) dQ(z I xi,x2). 
l[o,t) l[o,t) 
As for the second part, since 1 - a > 0, and Q( {Z = 1} I x 11 x2) = 1 - Q( {Z < 1} I 
Xt, x2) is strictly increasing in x 1 (by 8.5), we have: 
Q({Z = 1} I Xt,X2)(1- a) > Q({Z = 1} I x~,x2)(1- a), 
concluding the proof of the theorem. 
Note that at x2 = c2 ( x1 ) the inspector is indifferent between calling alarm or not 
and hence any randomization between tbe two is a best reply. But in our continuous 
model this is an event of probability 0. 
8.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2 
Given that 0 is using an equilibrium strategy t and given that m was diverted in 
the first period, x1 was observed and no alarm was called in first period, assume that 
the critical value for the inspector's second period test (Theorem 4.1) is c2 = c2(x1 ). 
If the operator completes the diversion bis ( conditional) .expected payoff is 
and if be retreats bis expected payoff is 
R(m) = -b(m)(l- cjJ(c2 -ß0 )). 
(]' 
We show now that tbe difference between the two is strictly increasing in m. In fact 
also 
c2 - ßt c2 - ßo 






-(1 + p-) > 0. 
(]' (J'l 
Therefore c/J( C2;/lo) decreases and c/J( ~) increases in m. Since b( m) increases in m 
and b > 0 it follows tbat tbe difference strictly increases in m. 
111 
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Proposition 8.10 For almost all x1 after which no alarm was called, and for any 
m < 1 diverted at first period, the conditional expected payoff difference 6.(m, c2) is 
strictly increasing in c2 • 
Proof As we computed in the proof of the previous Proposition the expected net 
payoff for completion is 
It is clearly enough to prove that the difference of the last two terms is strictly 
increasing in c2 • In fact 
where 
l: _ Jtt - Jto d _ c2 - Jtt + l: 
v- an y- v. 
2u u 
N oticing that 8 > 0 since m < 1, the result now follows since the ratio if>(y + 8) / if>(y - 8) 
is strictly decreasing in y by Lemma 8.2. 
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To prove the monotonicity of m"'(xt), note first that if both players use equilibrium 
strategies then m•(xt) < 1 for almost all x1 after which no alarmwas called. Since if 
m"'(xt) = 1 has a positive probability then at that event the inspector is sure that the 
diversion will not be completed at second period. Therefore he will either call alarm 
or not independently of the value of x 2 , which we know cannot happen in equilibrium. 
Therefore by Proposition 8.10 and the monotonicity of c2(x1), Theorem 4.1 (ii), 
Xt > x~ ==> 6.(m•(xt), c2(x~)) > 6.(m'"(xt), c2(xt)) = 0. 
So when m"'(xt) was already diverted and the firstsignalwas x~, the operator should 
complete diversion with certainty that is m•(x1) > m*(xi), completing the proof of 
Theorem 4.2. 
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8.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3 
Recall that for 0 the first stage strategy is a probability distributiop q on [0, 1] ( the 
probability distribution of the random amount m of material he diverts at the first 
stage,) while for the inspector the first stage strategy is any subset A1 of the realline 
R(the alarm set for the first stage: Call analarm if x 1 E A1). 
Given q(m) and an observation of x1 , denote by q(m I x1) the conditional proba-
bility distribution of m given x1• Since the density of x1 given m is 
1 -~(:v1-m)2 
C,Om(xt) = ~e 2"1 , 
V 27ruf 
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the conditional density q(m I x1) is given by 
( I <,Om(Xt) ( ) dj m Xt) = JJ <,Om(xt)di(m) dj m · 
We first prove the following result saying roughly that the higher is x 1 , the more likely 
it seems to I that m was high. 
Proposition 8.11 For any given q(m), the distribution q(m I x1) is stochastically 
increasing in Xt. 
Proof We want to show that for any () E [0, 1] the conditional probability 
P(M :::; () I Xt) decreases in x 1• In fact 
P(M <()I Xt) = J~ <,Om(Xt)dz(m) . 
- fo <,Om(xt)di(m) 
Since C,Om(x1) > 0 for all m and all x1 it follows that if P(M :::; () I Xt) = 0 then 
f~ dj(m) = 0 and hence P(M :::; () I x1) = 0 for all Xt in accordance to the claimed 
monotonicity. So we may assume that P( M :::; () I x 1 ) > 0 arid let us prove that its 
reciprocal is monotonically increasing in Xt: 
1 fr} <,Om(xt)di(m) 
P(M:::; ()I Xt) = 1 + f~ <,Om(xt)di(m) = 1 + J(xt) 
where 
J(xt) = f~ <,Om(xt)dJ(m) . 
· fo C,Om(xt)dJ(m) 
Agairr if f(xt) = 0 for a certain value of Xt, it remains so for all values of Xt in 
accordance to the claimed monotonicity. If J(xt) > 0, let e [0, 0) be any point in the 
support of its denominator then, 
Jl e -~(e-m)(2xt-m-e) dj(m) 
Since e < () :::; m the integrand in the last expression is increasing in Xt and hence the 
whole expression is decreasing in x 1 and it remains so when it is integrated f~ · · · dj( m) 
to obtain 1/ f(xt) which is therefore decreasing in x1• We conclude finally that f(x 1 ) 
is increasing in x1• 
1111 
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Let (s, t) be an equilibrium and consider the decision problern of I after the first 
stage, given x1 and given the strategy of 0 : If he calls an alarm his ( conditional 
expected payoff is 
/(At I Xt) = - fo1 a(m)dz(m I Xt)· (32) 
If he chooses Ct (not alarm) then, by Theorem 4.1 he will use a threshold test c2(x1) 
to decide whether or not to call an alarm at the second stage. His expected payoff 
(based on Xt only, before observing x2) is 
I(Ct I Xt) = _ /m•(mt) F(m)<P(c2(xt)- Po(m,xt))dz(m I Xt) lo u 
-11 F<P(c2(x1)- Pt(m,xt))dz(m I Xt) 
m•(mt) Cl 
- f'(••) a(m} ( 1 - .p("'(x,)-:•(m, xt))) di(m I x,) 
-11 a (t- <P(2(xt)- Pt(m,xt))) dz(m I Xt) 
m•(.211) Cl 
- fo1 d(m)dz(m I Xt)· 
This can be written as: 
J(Ct I Xt) = - fom•(mt)(F(m)- a(m))<P(c:~(mt}-~to(m,mt))dz(m I Xt) 
- J!;•(mt) a(m)dz(m I Xt)- f!•(1111~(F- a)<P(c:~(mt)-:t(m,w1 ))dz(m I Xt) 
is 
- f!•(m1) adz(m I Xt)- JJ d(m)dz(m I Xt)· 
(33) 
By Equations (32) and (33) the net expected difference between the two decisions 
!(At I Xt)- I(Ct I Xt) = fom"(mt)(F(m)- a(m))<P(c:~(mt)-:o(m,mt))dz(m I Xt) 
+ f!•(
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t)(F- a)<P(c:~(mt)-:•(m,wl))dz(m I Xt) 
- f!•(w1)(a(m)- a)dz(m I Xt) 
JJ d(m)dz(m I Xt)· 
(34) 
We shall show that the right hand side of Equation (34) is increasing in x1• In fact 
by our assumptions, both d(m) and -(a(m)- a) are increasing functions of m, and 
by Proposition 8.11 the conditional distribution q(m I Xt) is stochastically increasing 
in Xt, hence each of the last two terms in (34) is increasing in x1 • Therefore it suffices 
to show that the first two terms are also increasing in x1• To see this let us write 
<P as the integral of the appropriate normal density <p1112 (p), interchange the order of 
integration, and rewrite these terms as D( xt), 
D(xt) = f~1 ) {fom•(mt)(F(m)- a(m))<pw2(Po(m, Xt))dz(m I Xt, x2) 
+ f!•(11Jt) ( F - a )<pllJ2 (Pt ( m, Xt ))dz( m I Xt, x2)} dv2 . 
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(35) 
Now, the expression in { ... } is precisely I(A2 I Xt, x2)- I( 0 2 I Xt, x 2), the conditional 
expected difference of payoffs between calling analarm or not, given x1 and x2• This 
is the expression DI(x1 , x2 ) in the proof of Theorem 4.1. As we proved there, this 
is an increasing function in each of the two variables x1 and x2 • Since in the region 
of integration x2 E (-oo, c2(x1)) the inspector chooses 0 2 , it follows that it is also 
negative in that region. We conclude that 
fC2 (xt) 
D(xt) = 1-oo DI(xt, x2)dc2 , 
is a (negative) increasing function of x1 and hence the existence of a threshold c1 ( the 
zero point of D(xt)) such that the inspector calls an alarm at the first stage if and 
only if x1 > c1• 
1!11 
Note that the critical c1 can in principle be ±oo. The following proposition shows 
that in equilibrium -oo < c1• 
Proposition 8.12 In equilibrium there exists a sufficiently small {but finite) x 1 such 
that I(Ot I xt) > /(At I x1 ) holds. 
Proof If this was not true there would be an equilibrium in which I calls an alarm 
at the first stage independently of the value of x1 • The only best reply for that, from 
the point of view of 0 is not to divert at all at firststage (since -b(m) < 0 for all 
m > 0). We claim that these two strategies arenot in equilibrium. In fact a strategy 
of 0 which does not divert any material at first stage will make the full diversion at 
second stage if Xt is smaller than some critical value xr and the best reply of I to 
that is not to call a\arm at first stage and call one at second stage if Xt < xr, 
8.4 Proof of Theorems 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 
In this section we prove Theorems 5.4 which states that, under Assumption 8.1 on 
the joint distribution of MJF 1 and MJF 1, the CUMUF test is part of the ( only) 
equilibrium of the two stage game. Theorems 5.5 and 5.6 provide the equilibrium 
(which does not involve CUMUF ) in the extreme distributions which do not satisfy 
Assumption 8.1. 
We first solve c2 (xt) from equation (14) by straightforward manipulations to ob-
tain: 
(36) 






N ext we prove: 
Proposition 8.13 In equilibrium Ct = oo (i.e., there is no alarm at first stage). 
Proof This will follow from equation {15) if we prove that the inspector's payoff 
is strictly increasing in c1 for any finite c1, 
By substitution of c2 from {36) into /{ct,c2{·);q,m) and taking the partial derivative 
with respect to c1 we obtain: 
81( Ct, c2( · ); q, m) 
IJc1 
(1- q)a (C- Oct- p;ac1) ( c~ ) 
- 4> 1 exp --
O't J2i u2v'1 - p2 2ul 
q(1- a) (C- Oc1- (1-m)- p;a(ct- m)) ( (c1 - m)2 ) 
- 4> exp - 2 , u1 V2i u2v'1 - p2 2ut 
and the condition IJ/ /1Jc1 > 0 is therefore equivalent to 
(40) 
Let us define 
.. c c = , 
0'2y1- p2 
· ( .. lnH m2 ) 
p. = exp 60 + - 2- - ul Ct • 
With this notation, it follows from equation (16) that 
(41) 
and inequality ( 40) becomes 
</>(y) e6y > p. 
</>(y- 6) , (42) 
and we want to prove that it holds for all for all c1 i.e., for all y E ( -oo, oo) ( since y 
is linear in Ct with a negative coefficient). To see this we first show that 
1. </>(y) 6y 1m .1.( r) e = p.. 
!J-+-00 'r Y - V 
(43) 
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In fact, using L'Hospital's rule, 
lim <f>(y) e6Y = 
y~-00 <f>(y - ö) 
62 
- eT = ft· 
In the last step we used the fact that limy~-oo <f>(y )eY2 12 = 0 and then we applied 
equation ( 41 ). 
The proof of ineqw11ity ( 42) will be completed by proving that the derivative of 
the left hand side (with respect to y) is positive for all y. To do that we recall the 
MilZ 's Ratio defined as: 
R(y) = 1 ;,(~\y) = <~>;,(~) ' 
and malm use of its property (see Jonston and Kotz (1985) and Owen (1980)): 
0 < ~ (R~y)) < 1, Vy E (-oo,oo). (44) 
The left hand side of equation ( 42) has a positive derivative if and only if its derivative 
has a positive derivative which is the inequality 
(In <f>(y) )' - (ln <f>(y - ö) )' + ö > 0. 
Noting that (hi <f>(y))' = 1/ R(-y), this is equivalent to: 
1 1 ~-y+6 d ( 1 ) 
R( -y) R( -y + ö) + ö > 0, or -y dE R( x) dE < ö, 
which is true by inequality (44). This concludes the proof of Proposition 8.13 estab-
lishing that c1 = oo. 
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We now make use of the following property of the normal distribution (see e.g. 
Owen (1980) page 403): For any real constants a and ß, 
}z;, J: q\(a + ßx) exp (-~')tU= ql (;1: ß') . (45) 
Substitute c2(x1) = C- Ox1 and c1 = oo in the equilibrium conditions: 
From (12), by changing integrationvariables we have: 
b J
oo ),. (0-0xt-(1-m)-p~(xt-m)) ex (- (xt-m)2) dE 




Using ( 45) we get 
4> ( C- 1 + m(1 - 0) ) 
yu~(l- p2) +(Out+ pu2)2 _ _ b_ 
( 
0 )-1+b' 
4> Ju~(l - p2) + (Ou1 + pu2)2 
(46) 
From (15) we get: 
m - argmax{j_: ~ C- Ox,)- ~.~~2 ~/;>-(x, -m)) exp (- (x\~:)') ,m1 } 
- argmax{j_: ~ (0 - O(m + ~.~;~~; m)- P<T•'}-·: d.}. 
Apply equation ( 45) with 
a = c- 1 + m(1 - 0) and ß =-Out+ pu2 
u2v'1 - p2 u2v'1 - p2 
to obtain: 
"~,. ( c- 1 + m(1- O) ) ( c- 1 + m(1- o) ) m = argmaxo/ = argmax . 
u~ + 02u~ + 2p0ut 0"2 u~ + 02u? + 2p0ut 0"2 (47) 
This equation is clearly satisfied for any m if 0 = 1. Therefore choose 0 = 1 and m 
which satisfies equation (37) i.e., 
• Equation ( 46) for 0 = 1 yields 
( 
c -1 ) 
4> J u? + 2pul u2 + u~ 
~ c/<Tl+2~.1Td 11~) 
b 
= 1 + b' 
which is equation (16). 
• Finally, the expression for q is a straightforward solution of equations (38) and 
(39). 
This completes the proof of part (i) of Theorem 5.4. To see under which conditions 
this equilibrium is unique consider again Equation ( 4 7); since the right hand side is 
linear in m with coeffi.cient (1 - 0), then either the coefficient is zero- the case which 
we considered - or it is one of the following two cases: 
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Case 1 lf () > 1, the maximum is at m = 0 which then implies, by equation (37) 
that 
(J'2 
1 < () = -p-
(]'1 
i.e., p < -atf a 2 in contradiction with Assumption 8.1. 
Case 2 If () < 1, the maximum is at m = 1 which then implies, by equation (37) 
that 
1 < () = - (J'2 
pa1 
i.e., p < -a2ja11 again in contradiction with Assumption 8.1. 
We conclude that under Assumption 8.1 the only possibility is 8 = 1, completing 
the proof of (ii). 
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To prove Theorems 5.5 and 5.6 note that c1 = oo, and equations (37), (38),(39), 
( 46) were proved using only the part p < 0 from Assumption 8.1. Therefore the only 
other equilibria can occur through cases 1 and 2 mentioned above. 
Case 1 can occur when p < -at/a2 and then m = 0 and () = -pa2ja1. Substi-
tuting this in Equation ( 46) yields Equation (17) for C and completes the proof of 
Theorem 5.5. Similarly, 
Case 2 can occur when p < -a2/ a1 and then m = 1 and () = -a2/ (pa1 ). Substi-
tuting this in Equation ( 46) yields Equation (18) for C and completes the proof of 
Theorem 5.6. 
8.5 Proof of Theorem 6.1 
In this section w~ prove Theorem 6.1 stating that there is no equilibrium in which 
0 diverts a certain quantity q at the first stage. We start by making the following 
observations: 
1. A sure diversion of m = 1 at the first stage is clearly not possible in equilibrium. 
Hence the support of q must be some m < 1. 
2. There cannot be a finite xr such that player 0 completes the diversion if and 
only if Xt ~ xr since then I will call an alarm (in first or second period) 
whenever Xt ~ xr (since he knows a full diversion has taken place.) This means 
that with positive probability (namely P{x1 ~ x!} the operatorwill complete 
the diversion knowing that he will certainly be detected. Obviously 0 would be 
better off not diverting. 
3. There cannot be an equilibrium in which 0 diverts m in the first period and 
then surely completes diversion ( or surely retreat) for an interval of x1 of positive 
measure, since the best reply of I would be either a sure alarm or a sure non-
aiarm ( on that interval), which cannot be an equilibrium strategy. 
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4. It follows that if q is concentrated at a single value m then 0 's strategy is of 
the form: 
• Divert m at first period and then, as x1 is observed and no alarm was 
called, complete diversion with probability 0 < O(xt) < 1 (and retreat 
with probability 1 - O(xt)). 
We also need the following, rather intuitive, result: 
Proposition 8.14 There is no equilibrium with c1 = -oo ezcept ior that with q = 1 
(the 'open conflict equilibrium' mentioned in section 5.2). 
Proof The idea of the proof is rather simple: c1 = -oo means that the inspector 
always calls an alarm at the first stage, independently of x1• His payoff in this case 
is -a. This is certainly not the best thing to do if there is a positive probability 
1 - q that the operator behaves legally. More specifically consider the strategy u c = 
( oo, 0 - Xt) that is: never call an alarm at first stage and call alarm at the second 
stage if x:~ > 0- Xt. This is the CUMUF test with threshold 0. We claim that, for 
small enough constant 0, the strategy u0 yields for I a payoff strictly larger than -a. 
To prove this we have to show that the conditional payoff to I given that there was 
no alarm is larger than -a (since this event has a positive probability for any finite 
0). To do this Iet 
Po - Pr {no diversionlno alarm} 
1- 00 (0-101-P~IIll}) ( m2) 
- u1J; f-oo </> ua'Jt-p2 exp =i;r dtt 
(48) 
and 
Pt - Pr { diversionlno alarm} 
_ --.!I......f~ 4> (o-t-(1111-m)-p~(1D1-m)) exp (-(101-r>2} dct. 
u1vllw oo u2'Jt-p2 2u1 
(49) 
The probability of no alarm is Po + Pt and the conditional payoff of I in this 
event is 0 · Po - 1 · Pt thus we have to show that for sufficiently small G we have 
-Pt > -a(Po +Pt) or, equivalently, 
Po 1-a ->--. 
Pt a 
(50) 
In the expression for Po change variable, x = xtfu1 and use (45) for cx = O/u2J1- p2 
and ß = -(ut + pu2)/u:~J1- p2. Do similarly for Pt to obtain 
Thus we have 
Po 1 - q <f>(y + 6) 




y = 2 and 8 = 2 . Jl + (ut + pu2)2 Jl + (ut + pu2)2 
Since, by Lemma 8.2, the ratio at the right hand side tends to oo as y --+ -oo (i.e., as 
C --+ -oo ), it follows that for C sufficiently small, the right hand side will be larger 
than (1 - a)ja and inequality (50) will be satisfied. This completes the proof of 
Proposition 8.14. 
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So, let s = ( Ct, c2 ( ·)) and r = (m, 0( ·)) be a pair of equilibrium strategies where 
c2 (second period threshold) and 0 (completion probability) are functions of x1 • 
The fact that 0 < 0( x 1) < 1 implies that 0 is indifferent between completion and 
retreating. For x 1 < c1 this yields precisely equation (23): 
4> ( c2(xt)- :t(m, Xt)) 
b 
4> ( c2(x1)- :o(m, Xt) 
which is to hold now for the fixed m and for all x 1 < c1• 







with 8 > 0 (since m < 1 ). By Corollary 8.3, there is a unique solution which we 
denote by Z ( m) and hence, for all x1 < c1 we have: 
(52) 
For x 1 < c1 and x2 = c2(x1), player I is indifferent between calling or not calling 
an alarm at the second period which implies: 
or, 
(53) 
where O(x1 I c2(x1)) is the conditional probability of diversion given the observations 
Xt and x2 = c2(xt). That is, 
O( I ( )) <p(c2(xt) I m,D) 
Xt c2 Xt = O(x1)cp(c2(xt) Im, D) + (1- O(xt))~p(c2(xt) Im, R) ' 
where <p(c2(xt) Im, D) and <p(c2(x1 ) Im, R) are densities of x2 at x2 = c2(x1), given 
Xt and given that 0 diverted or retreated respectively i.e., 
<p(c2(xt) I m,D) = ~e-2!2(c2(x!)-ttd2, 
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and 
<,o(c2(xt) Im, R) ::::: 1 e-~(c2(wl)-!1o)2 • 
V2iW2 
Substituting c2(x1) from (52) we see that <p(c2(x!) I m, D) and <p(c2(x1) I m, R) do 
not depend on x1 (only on m.) It follows from equation (53) that: 
• The completion probability O(x1) is constant for Xt :::; Ct. 
Denoting this constant probability by 0, the equilibrium strategy of 0 can then be 
described by the pair of numbers (m, 0). Given such a strategy, the decision of the 
inspector after the observation of Xt, is either to call an alarm and get a payoff -a 
or not call an alarm and get an expected payoff: 
Again by substituting c2(xt) from equation (52), this expression is independent of x1. 
If it is smaller than -a, then I calls an alarm for all x1 i.e., c1 = -oo. If on the other 
hand the above expression is greater than -a, then c1 = oo. By Proposition 8.14, it 
cannot be that in equilibrium c1 = -oo. Therefore we conclude that c1 = oo i.e., the 
inspector never calls an alarm at the first period. (The case in which the expected 
payoff for no alarm is equal to -a is also excluded in equilibrium since this would 
make I indifferent between c1 = -oo and c1 = oo, but then 0 could decrease slightly 
m or 0 to induce I to choose c1 = oo yielding a higher payoff to 0 . ) 
With no alarm at the first period, the expected payoff for the operator is ( using 
his indifference between D and Rand substituting c2 from (52)): 
O(s, r) = -b (t- qS ( c2(xt~ -~to)) 
- - b + bqS ( z ~)) . (54) 
Since Z(m) is determined by m (and the parameters of the game of course), the 
payoff of 0 at the equilibrium is a function of m which therefore, has to attain its 
maximum at the equilibrium value of m. We claim that this value is m = 0. 
Proposition 8.15 The equilibrium payoff for the operator as given in (54), attains 
its maximum at m = 0. 
Proof Since qS is an increasing function, it is enough to see that Z(m) decreases 
in m. In fact, recalling that Z(m) is the unique solution of equation (51), we have 
to show that this solution is decreasing in m or equivalently, increasing in 8 (since 
8 =1-m), and this is proved Lemma 8.4. 
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The intuition behind this result is the following: The inspector does not call an 
alarm at the first period and sets a critical value of x2 for the second period. Since it is 
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known that 0 is diverting m, the observation x 1 is not informative and the threshold 
for second period alarm depends therefore only on m ( and on x1 only through the 
dependence of x 1 and x2 ). Denoting this threshold by C(m) it is clear that it decreases 
in m (since the higher m the easier is to complete the diversion and the more alert 
has I to be.) Now, since 0 is indifferent between completing or not completing 
the diversion, his payoff equals that due to false alarm when he does not complete 
diversion which is -b(1- <fo(C(m))). Clearly 0 is interested therefore in increasing 
the threshold c( m) i.e., decreasing m. 
So far we proved that if there is an equilibrium with singulat distribution q, it 
must be of the form: 
• 0 commits no diversion at the first period. 
• I does not call an alarm at the first period. 
• At the second period, 0 diverts the full 1 with probability () (and with proba-
bility 1 - () makes no diversion). 
• I calls an alarm at the second period if and only if x2 exceeds a critical value 
c2(x1). 
To find such an equilibrium we know already by (52) that 
for some constant K (which is Z(O) in equation (52).) 
Equation (53) now becomes: 
Oe-~(c2(xi)-p*x1-1)2 + (1 _ O)e-~(c2 (xi)-p*xl)2 
__ l (K-t)2 
e 2u2 
- oe-~(K-1)2 + (1- O)e-~K2 
This last equation determines (), 
Can this be an equilibrium pair of strategies ? Clearly, the inspector's strategy is a 
best reply to the operator's strategy since with no diversion at the first period, the 
threshold strategy isthebest test (by the Neyman Pearson Lemma). ls 0 's strategy 
a best reply to I 's strategy ? His payoff at this point is (by (54)) his payoff for no 
diversion since he is indifferent between the two alternatives: 
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Suppose now that he uses a different strategy f according to which he diverts the full 
amount 1 at the first period. With this reply, his expected payoff is: 
O(s, f) - -b (I- q, ( c,(xt) ~ p~x,)) + 4> ( c,(xt) ~ p~x,) 
- -b + b~ ( ~) + ~ ( ~) > O(s, r). 
This means that r is not a best reply to s. We conclude that there is no equilibrium 
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